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LINDDUN is a framework to identify privacy threats and elicit privacy requirements 
from a system. It has complete procedures and strong support on privacy requirements 
analysis. This research tries to figure out how practically we can apply the LINDDUN 
methodology in privacy requirements analysis. This thesis studies LINDDUN in a case 
project name Rin-Tin-Tinder for privacy threats and privacy requirements analysis. The 
analysis results are compared with the privacy requirement elicited by the project team 
in a workshop session. The analysis result is verified through a comparison with the 
Microsoft privacy guideline.  
 
The discussions and analysis on comparison implies strengths and weakness of the 
LINDDUN methodology. Compared to workshop, the LINDDUN methodology lead the 
analyst to identify more privacy threats and get more privacy requirements, and makes 
analyzing process more predictable. Meanwhile, the LINDDUN methodology has a 
blind spot on users’ unintentional false instructions. The thesis discussed possible 
directions to improve LINDDUN and summarize a guide rules on assumption making, 
which is an important procedure in LINDDUN. These findings will be helpful for 
LINDDUN’s further improvement.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background  
Privacy has been a hotspot for a long period, especially in software fields. In order to 
make good use of the Internet and computer technology, an increasing number of 
software products are created and produced. At the meanwhile, privacy becomes a 
problem to both software development groups and their users. People’s explorations on 
protecting privacy never stop. In 2002, Microsoft made STRIDE 1  threat modeling 
framework to improve information security. Microsoft privacy guidelines were 
proposed in 2008 to provide people advices on dealing with privacy issues in software 
development [Microsoft, 2008]. Building a sufficient privacy policy is also a feasible 
solution to privacy problems [Dennedy et al., 2014], which has been used in most 
websites and web applications. Besides, modeling privacy threats is another direction to 
protect privacy, which is studied by learners and researchers [Beckers, et al., 2014]. 
This thesis will focus on one privacy threats modeling and privacy requirements 
analysis methodology: the LINDDUN methodology. 
 
The LINDDUN methodology is one of many methods to model privacy threats and 
analyze privacy requirements in software development. It contains complete concept 
framework about privacy threat and detailed procedures to elicit privacy requirements. 
The name of LINDDUN is an abbreviation of seven privacy threat categories: 
Linkability, Identifiability, Non-repudiation, Detectability, information Disclosure, 
content Unawareness and policy/consent Non-compliance. The LINDDUN 
methodology was built by Mina Deng, et al. [Deng et al., 2010], and developed by Kim 
Wuyts, et al. [Wuyts, 2015]. The LINDDUN methodology is available and live update 
online. The version of LINDDUN which is discussed in this thesis is before May, 2016. 
 
1.2. Research objectives   
The research objective of this research is to figure out how practically we can apply the 
LINDDUN methodology in privacy requirements analysis. The LINDDUN 
methodology is an approach to analyze a system and elicit threats and requirements 
from this system. The author of LINDDUN introduced a Social network 2.0 sample to 
explain the LINDDUN methodology in her thesis. Kim Wuyts and her research group 
has also descript two experimental cases, and came up with suggestions to improve the 
LINDDUN methodology. However, is there any points or procedures unclear to readers 
and analysts? Does the LINDDUN methodology have any weakness in privacy 
                                                 
1 STRIDE is a method to deal with computer security threats. It is developed by Microsoft.  
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requirement analysis? In order to answer these questions, the process of the LINDDUN 
methodology shall be studied, analyzed and discussed. The final goal of this thesis is to 
point out probable weakness and put forward constructive suggestions to improve the 
LINDDUN methodology.  
 
1.3. Research methods 
In order to solve the research questions, a case study is used. Case study is a research 
method to study a new objective. The objective can be a method, a concept or a theory. 
Case study is chosen because that the LINDDUN methodology contains a concept 
framework and a complete method at the same time. It is important to figure out what 
LINDDUN does and how it works. A social network system, named Rin-Tin-Tinder 
(RTT), is the study case. The author acts as an analyst to apply the LINDDUN 
methodology to the RTT system. After analysis, a privacy threat list and a privacy 
requirement list will be output and discussed for further findings. 
 
Additionally, an interview is made to collect data from development group of the RTT. 
Before the case system is analyzed, a workshop has been made by three members of the 
RTT development group to find out privacy threats for the RTT system. The workshop 
produced a privacy threat list as a result. This result might be valuable to research 
questions.  
 
1.4. Thesis structure  
The thesis consists of three parts, and they are literature review, case study and final 
conclusion. Chapter 2 contains generic concepts related to privacy issues. Chapter 3 
presents an overview of study target: LINDDUN, including concept framework, method 
procedures, and other necessary methods used in this thesis. In the second part, a case 
study is introduced and proceed. It produces some result with the help of LINDDUN. 
Then, in part 3, new findings from part 2 are discussed. Some advices are produced to 
improve LINDDUN. Finally, in the last chapter, there shall be a conclusion of the whole 
thesis, and a few words about what further work could be done based on this thesis.  
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2. Data privacy  
Defining the term privacy is difficult in the information science field.  The term can be 
described from different perspectives, and it is difficult to tell which perspective is 
complete. Legal and policy scholar Alan F. Westin asserted that “no definition … is 
possible, because privacy issues are fundamentally matters of values, interests and 
power” [Alan F.W., 1967]. The process of understanding a concept is to put it into a 
specific application domain. In this chapter, a set of privacy related concepts in software 
development domain will be introduced and discussed.   
 
2.1. The right to Privacy  
When people talk about privacy, in most situations they mean the right to privacy. 
Warren and Brandeis [1890] articulated the definition and importance of the right to 
privacy already as early as 1890. By reviewing “The Right to Privacy”, the right to 
privacy is might related to personal rights. They summarized 6 general rules of the right 
to privacy [p.214–p.218] and 2 remedies for an invasion of the right to privacy [p.219], 
which makes a big progress on privacy concept. The six rules are: 1.The right to privacy 
does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest; 2.The 
right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter, though in its nature 
private, when the publication is made under circumstances which would render it a 
privileged communication according to the law of slander and libel; 3. The law would 
probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the 
absence of special damage; 4. The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the 
facts by the individual, or with his consent; 5. The truth of the matter published does not 
afford a defense; 6. The absence of " malice" in the publisher does not afford a defense. 
The two remedies are: 1.An action of tort for damages in all cases; 2.An injunction, in 
perhaps a very limited class of cases. Obviously, the right to privacy is closely 
connected to publication. It is descript as a law term. They importance of individual and 
community is highlighted. The right to privacy is a kind of right they have. 
 
However, is the right to privacy only meaningful to individual? The answer is no. With 
increasing knowledge of privacy, some scholars have been awareness of the importance 
of society in learning and defining the right to privacy. Solove [2006, p.483] has stated 
that privacy cannot be understood independently from the society in his law review. 
Similar thoughts can also be found in other resources. For example, Cohen [2000]   
summarizes three debates on the right to privacy: 1. Ownership of a certain kind of 
information; 2.Freedom of choice and its necessary preconditions; and 3.The 
 4 
substantive value of personally identified information. He states that the costs of privacy 
are borne by society, or other individuals.  
 
Privacy is more than a pure legal concept [Onn et al., 2005]. It has various meanings in 
psychological, social and political fields, and privacy causes different harms in different 
situations. Different concepts related to the right to privacy are summarized from 
different views, and one of these descriptions can be taken as an example [Onn et al., 
2005, p.12]: 
The right to privacy is our right to keep a domain around us, which includes all those 
things that are part of us, such as our body, home, thoughts, feelings, secrets and identity. 
The right to privacy enables us to choose which parts in this domain can be accessed by 
others, and control the extent, manner and timing of the use of those parts we choose to 
disclose.    
The definition of the right to privacy is a generic level description. According to this 
definition, privacy is more like a right for people to choose, and it is tightly connected to 
people’s permission and willing.  
 
Another great contribution is given by professor Solove [2002] is his theory on 
conceptualizing privacy concepts and privacy issues. Solove proposed that privacy, or 
the right to privacy, is not a unitary concept. It has diversity across different situations. 
Instead of finding “family resemblances” from all privacy concepts, it would be easier 
to draw from a common pool of similar elements. Solove divided privacy rights into 4 
types: information collection, information processing, information dissemination and 
invasion. A concept pool is provided as a strong support to analyst. The mind of 
concept pool has heavily influenced people’s explosion on privacy protection. The 
definition of privacy and related concepts was debated over and over, and becoming 
increasingly clear. People’s pursuit of privacy is still going on. 
 
Although the concept of privacy never reaches a consensus conclusion, most researchers 
agree on its importance. The right to privacy kept drawing people’s attention after it 
appeared. James Rachels stated in his paper “Why privacy is important” that privacy is a 
precondition for controlling people’s various relationships that they value [Rachels, 
1975]. It implies the features of privacy: valuable and powerful. However, these 
descriptions are obviously not clear and accurate enough. To further understand privacy, 
it is necessary to figure out in details what are “those things that are part of us”.  
 
2.2. Data privacy  
Data privacy has no global, consistent definition. Even though, it frequently appears in 
literature and legal documents, such as “European Data Protection Law” [European 
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Data Protection Law, 2014] and “New Privacy Legislation” [McCormick and Michelle, 
2011]. The first edition of European Data Protection Law was published in 1998. Now, 
it has been gradually accepted by European Union member states and becomes 
influential globally. In European Data Protection Law, the description of the right to 
data protection and personal data is respectively close to data privacy and personal 
information (PI), which will be discussed in this thesis. European Data Protection Law 
states that the data protection is “a right to protection against the collection and use of 
personal data”, and it “forms a part of the right to respect for private and family life, 
home and correspondence” [McCormick and Michelle, 2011, p.14]. 
 
In another resource, “Privacy Engineer’s Manifesto” [Dennedy et al., 2014, p25], data 
privacy is “a derivative of the substantive right to privacy in that it is about data that has 
been created about an individual a. by him- or herself, b. by others through observations 
and analysis, or c. by the consumption or processing (i.e., use) of that data about an 
individual by others.” Compared to other definitions of privacy, the key point in this 
definition is data. Data privacy could be simply defined as a kind of special privacy, 
whose medium is data. Additionally, data is especially related to personal identifiers. In 
this thesis, the data privacy mainly means the privacy closely related to data in social 
media sites and applications, stored in service providers’ servers, and distinguished 
from other privacy forms, such as the one in a bank or a police system. 
 
The right to privacy changes with technological progress. With network and digital 
devices getting gradually integrated into people’s daily life, an increasing number of 
data privacy disclosure events happen to users, organizations, and enterprises. Plenty of 
social network websites and web applications are accepted by users and change people’s 
communication means, such as Facebook, Instagram2, Twitter3, LinkedIn4, QQ, Wechat, 
Weibo5 and so on. Social network enter people’s life, so does data privacy. However, 
data privacy gets less attention than it deserves. When people enjoy the convenience and 
happiness brought by social network, they hardly notice the privacy policies on the sign 
up page and the risks behind the products and services. Most users finds privacy boring 
until their own self-interests are compromised [Dennedy et al., 2014]. Due to the highly 
developed information science and technology, digital privacy disclosure events are not 
far from people’s life. Data privacy is not only crucial but also worthy deserving more 
attention from every social network services’ practitioner and user.  
 
                                                 
2 Instagram is an online mobile photo-sharing, video-sharing and social networking service.  
3 www.twitter.com  
4 www.linkedin.com  
5 Three popular social media applications in China.  
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2.2.1. Personal identifiable information 
What shall data be like? There are plenty of data transferring on the Internet every 
moment, are they all under the protection of privacy? The answer is no. When 
discussing data privacy, some terms, such as personal data, personal information (PI) 
and personal identifiable information (PII), are often mentioned. They are all the data 
that people care about and shall be protected. This thesis will not distinguish the 
difference among these terms. PII will be used in this thesis for discussion.  
Traditionally and literally, PII is information that directly identifies an individual, or any 
other anonymous information which could be surely related to only one single person 
when all of those are combined. For example, one social security number can only 
identify one person, and it is a kind of PII. When information in age, blood type and 
birthday is combined, it is possible to identify one single person. They are PII, too. In 
addition, a person’s name, age, gender, phone number, national even position, 
nickname, etc. is PII. The information is “those things that are part of us”. In European 
Data Protection Law, there is a definition of personal data, which has similar meaning 
to personal information [European data protection law, 2014, p.36]: 
Data are personal data if they relate to an identified or at least identifiable person, 
the data subject. 
A person is identifiable if additional information can be obtained without 
unreasonable effort, allowing the identification of the data subject. 
Authentication means proving that a certain person possesses a certain identity 
and/or is authorized to carry out certain activities. 
There are special categories of data, so-called sensitive data, listed in Convention 
108 and in the Data Protection Directive, which require enhanced protection and, 
therefore, are subject to a special legal regime. 
Data are anonymized if they no longer contain any identifiers; they are 
pseudonymous if the identifiers are encrypted. 
In contrast to anonymized data, pseudonymous data are personal data. 
 
This is a more rigorous definition of personal identifiable information from a legal 
standpoint. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is an international 
organization and promotes worldwide proprietary, industrial and commercial standards. 
Similar definition can be found in ISO standards. The ISO/IEC 29100:2011 and 
ISO/IEC 29101:2013 [ISO 29101, 2013] definite a privacy framework and a privacy 
architecture framework respectively, which are both related closely to personal 
identifiable information. ISO/IEC 29100:2011 provides a privacy framework which 
[ISO 29100, 2011, p.1]:  
- specifies a common privacy terminology; 
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- defines the actors and their roles in processing personally identifiable 
information (PII); 
- describes privacy safeguarding considerations; 
- provides references to known privacy principles for information technology. 
ISO/IEC 29100:2011 is applicable to natural persons and organizations involved in 
specifying, procuring, architecting, designing, developing, testing, maintaining, 
administering, and operating information and communication technology systems or 
services where privacy controls are required for the processing of PII.  
 
In ISO 29100:2011, more than 20 items are listed as examples, showing what personal 
information or personal identifiable information can be like [ISO 29100, 2011, p.8]. 
There are not only items which are commonly known as personal information, such as 
name, date of birth, gender, national identifiers, or ethnic origin, etc.  
 
  
Figure 2-1: Example of attributes that can be used to identify natural persons [ISO 29100, 2011] 
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PII is a broad concept. For information owners, the importance of different kinds of PII 
shall be different. Telling if a piece of personal identifiable information is harmful or 
not would be another discussion. A word in European Data Protection Law informs the 
difference, “sensitive”. Some forms of PII are additionally considered “sensitive,”, 
because these PII can easily cause harm or discriminate against someone. Different 
cultures have different standards on sensitive PIIs, some common examples are shown 
as following [Dennedy et al., 2014, p.31]: 
 • Information about an individual’s medical or health conditions 
• Financial information 
• Racial or ethnic origin 
• Political opinions 
• Religious or philosophical beliefs 
• Trade union membership 
• Sexual orientation 
• Information related to offenses or criminal convictions 
Obviously, the examples above are more likely harmful if they are disclosed. They are 
the information which people try to protect from others. Everyone takes care of these 
information no matter they belong to themselves or others. However, for a certain 
system, it is hard and unnecessary to distinguish if the data is sensitive or not. PII, as a 
term, “applies to those commercial entities that collect data that can be reasonably 
linked to a specific consumer, computer, or other device” [Federal Trade Commission, 
2014]. PII shall be the minimum unit in this thesis.  
 
2.2.2. Privacy threat 
Literately, privacy threat is something or actions which threats the right to privacy. 
There is not offical definition for privacy threat. However, privacy threat shows 
properties. Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Hansen [2010]  stated 6 privacy properties. 
They are: anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability, pseudonymity, and 
identity management. Deng, et al.[2010] refined these privacy properties and extended 
them to 8 privacy properties: unlinkability, anonymity, pseudonymity, plausible 
deniability, undetectability and unobservability, confidentiality, content awareness, and 
policy and consent compliance [Deng, et al., 2010]. From these 8 privacy properties, 7 
privacy threat types are defined. They are: linkability, identifiability, non-repudiation, 
detectability, disclosure of information, content awareness, and policy and consent non-
compliance. All privacy threats in the LINDDUN methodology are supposed to belong 
to one or plural privacy threat types above. Privacy threat is the thing that all privacy 
related practitioners want to keep away from their PII.  
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In order to explain all privacy properties, item of Interests (IOI) shall be introduced 
firstly. IOI means information on an individual, which could cause a privacy issue, such 
as subject, message, action, and so on. Some IOIs can be personal identifiable 
information. 
 
The unlinkability [Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010] of two IOIs means, an attacker cannot 
make sure if these two IOIs are linked or not. For example, to a stranger, a random user 
identifier and a random password have unlinkability, but two messages from the same 
user are linkable.  
 
The anonymity [Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010] of a subject means that in a group of 
subjects, an attacker cannot make sure which one is this subject. For example, in an 
online chat room, every user shows the same id when they chat, then every user in this 
chat room has anonymity. Pseudonymity means using pseudonym. A pseudonym is an 
identifier which a subject uses instead of real name. For instance, nick name in some 
social networks.  
 
The Plausible Deniability [Roe et al., 1997] is the opposite effect of non-repudiation. It 
means there is no evidence to prove the concurrence of an event or action. For example, 
if a system does not record logs or messages, it cannot be determined that if this system 
was running at a passive moment.   
 
The undetectability [Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010] of an IOI means an attacker cannot 
make sure if this IOI exists or not. For example, in a social network website, an attacker 
cannot make sure if one certain phone number exists in database or not. The 
unobservability of the IOI has two points. Firstly, unobservability means the IOI is 
undetectable by attackers. At the same time, every subject involved in this IOI is 
anonymous to other subjects. For example, in a private chat room, all messages and user 
information cannot be detectable by other users. If a nickname is not unique and not 
verified, the information of every user in this chat room has unobservability.  
 
The confidentiality means protecting authorized restrictions about information access 
and disclosure [McCallister et al., 2009]. For example, people transfer encrypted 
messages, or add access control to a database which contains private information. 
Confidentiality is known as a security property. It refers closely to preserve privacy 
properties, so confidentiality is also a privacy property.  
 
The awareness has various concepts. Generally, it is explained as people’s a kind of 
perception, comprehension, projection or understanding to a certain objective. This 
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objective can be a set of elements in an environment among a period of time[Endsley, 
1995]. It also can be status of a system [Sohlenkamp, 1998] or activities of other people, 
even themselves [Dourish and Bellotti, 1992].  
 
The compliance means a kind of agreement that the data subject allows others to 
process their personal data. All data shall be processed under the users’ willing and 
permissions [European, 1995]. For example, in Facebook’s privacy policy, there are 
items which explain what kind of data Facebook collects from users, and what kind of 
data shall be public. Users need to know enough details and agree with this privacy 
policy before they use Facebook service. 
 
2.3. Privacy Protection In Software Development 
Privacy is meaningful not only to people, but also to software development. All 
developers and engineers try to improve their system and make it trustworthy. In 
software development lifecycle, the earlier problems are found, the less they cost 
[Wiegers, 2003]. Privacy threat is supposed to be found and solved as early as possible 
to protect PII. The question is, when and how to deal with privacy problems in a 
software development lifecycle. 
 
2.3.1. Privacy policy 
A privacy policy is “a statement or a legal document (privacy law) that discloses some 
or all of the ways a party gathers, uses, discloses and manages a customer or client’s 
data”. [McCormick and Michelle, 2011] In ISO standards: “Privacy policy overall 
intention and direction, rules and commitment, as formally expressed by the PII 
controller related to the processing of PII in a particular setting.” [IS0 29101, 2011] 
Privacy policy is a means of protection wildly used in software development. It is an 
official statement and a promise of privacy from service providers. Figure 2-2 is a 
screenshot of privacy policy presented on Twitter’s privacy policy page. Twitter’s 
privacy policy explains how and when Twitter collects, uses and shares users’ 
information. It lists Twitter’s methods to collect information in detail, and announces 
that users who get Twitter’s service have authorized Twitter to use their information. 
Similar descriptions about privacy policy could be found on popular social network 
sites, like Facebook, LinkedIn, etc., and these descriptions partly present functions and 
features of a privacy policy.  
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Figure 2-2 Privacy policy of twitter  6 
Privacy policy has a wide variety. Most countries have their own legislations and 
guidelines about who is covered, what information can be collected, and what it can be 
used for. Except for the data usage statement, the exact contents of a privacy policy will 
depend upon the applicable law and may need to address requirements across 
geographical boundaries and legal jurisdictions. The content of privacy policy can be 
various depending on system type. In general, a privacy policy consists of following 
items [Dennedy et al., 2014, p.80]:  
• Local and international legal, jurisdictional, and regulatory necessities, 
depending on the scope of the enterprise 
•  Organization or business requirements 
•  Permission for the marketing–customer relationship for management or business 
intelligence 
•  Brand identity 
•  Industry standards 
•  Usability, access, and availability for end users of information systems 
•  Economic pressure to create value through efficient sharing or relationship 
building 
•  Enforceability and compliance 
•  Ethical obligations 
•  Realistic technology capabilities and limitations 
Items above are common factors of a privacy policy. A complete privacy policy can 
contains plenty of content, even some of them are not related to privacy. A privacy 
policy not only presents the expectations from service providers to users, but also reflect 
strategies service provider use to solve privacy issues. It shows service provider’s 
attitude to privacy in many perspectives.  
 
As an official statement of a business enterprise or of a web service provider, privacy 
policy has the responsibility to help the enterprises to avoid potential legal issues. On 
                                                 
6 This page is available as: https://twitter.com/privacy  
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the other hand, it shall be helpful to protect the users from potential personal 
information disclosure. Privacy policy plays an important role between social network 
and web application service providers and their users. Every mature enterprise shall 
have sufficiently consideration about the content of their privacy policy.  
 
2.3.2. Microsoft privacy guideline 
The Microsoft privacy guideline [2008] provides basic privacy concepts, privacy 
scenarios and rules to help software engineers and developers to build a privacy secure 
system. It offers privacy guidelines on a generic level. It would be useful for software 
engineers and developers who first time consider about privacy issues for their system. 
In first half part, Microsoft privacy guideline presents definitions about privacy and data 
types. It shows what privacy is, what privacy does, and what kind of data shall be 
protected. Then, in the other part, it provides nine privacy scenarios and some relevant 
rules to suggest users. It includes [2008]:  
1. Transferring PII to and from the user’s system; 
2. Storing PII on the user’s system; 
3. Transferring anonymous/pseudonymous data from user systems 
4. Installing software on a user’s system; 
5. Deploying a web site; 
6. Storing and processing user data at the company; 
7. Transferring user data outside the company; 
8. Interacting with children; 
9. Server deployment.  
Scenario 2: Storing PII on the user’s system is taken as an example. Firstly, Microsoft 
privacy guideline lists three possible examples in scenario 2: 1.Storing the user’s 
contacts; 2. Caching Web pages that contain PII; 3.Storing PII in cookie. Secondly, all 
guides and suggestions are started with either “must” or “should”. For example, “Users 
must be able to review and edit stored PII they entered”, or “Users should be able to 
control whether PII is stored, and delete any PII stored on the user’s system, including 
hidden PII”. There are totally 8 guides in scenario 2.  
 
The Microsoft privacy guideline is a useful tool for developers, engineers and analysts. 
The suggestions in the Microsoft privacy guideline contains plenty of situations which 
developers might meet in practical project. All the rules and suggestions are like privacy 
requirements, and they are easy to understand. However, it has limitations. All rules are 
made based on a fixed way, which cannot apply for some specific systems. Nine 
scenarios can apply for most situations, but not all. Besides, a combination of guidelines 
and rules is not a structured approach. The Microsoft privacy guideline is a good 
standard to verify the correctness of other methods. All privacy requirements, which can 
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be related to the rules in the Microsoft privacy guideline, are regarded as correct privacy 
requirements. 
 
2.3.3. ProPAn 
ProPAn [Beckers, et al., 2014] is a structured approach for analysts to semi-
automatically identify privacy threats. Its workflow is shown in Figure2-3. The ProPAn 
consists of four steps: Draw context diagram and problem diagrams, add privacy 
requirements to model, generate privacy threat graphs and analyze privacy threat graphs. 
The ProPAn methodology is an approach to identify privacy threats from functional 
requirements and privacy requirements. The frist two steps are regarded as preparation 
steps. With the input of the first two steps, threat graphs will be automatically generated 
in the third step, and privacy threats can be analyzing in last step. 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Illustration of the ProPAn method [Beckers, et al., 2014]  
The ProPAn methodology is strictly not for privacy requirements analysis. It is used to 
identify privacy threats. It means that, before the ProPAn method is applied, problems 
are clear, and requirements are ready. It is good for experts and analysts to find hidden 
privacy threats in a system. However, for a normal user with limited privacy knowledge, 
it is hard to elicit privacy requirements directly form a system. The ProPAn has its 
limitation on its usage.   
 
2.3.4. Summary  
In this chapter, three privacy protection means are introduced and discussed. Privacy 
policy is a widely used means to protect privacy. For every application which collects 
users’ information, there shall be a privacy policy to inform users and avoid potential 
legal issues for the enterprise. The Microsoft privacy guideline contains plenty of useful 
suggestions and rules about privacy protection in software development. It is a 
combination of people’s experience on protecting privacy. But it is not a constructive 
approach. The ProPAn is a threat identifying method, which has detailed procedures. It 
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is a good example of threat identifitition methods. However, it does little help on 
privacy requirements eliciation. All three privacy protection means have advantages and 
disadvantages.  
 
2.4. Introduction to LINDDUN 
The LINDDUN methodology is designed to address the privacy threats in a system for 
software engineers. It is helpful and practical to identify privacy threats and elicit 
privacy requirements. It can be applied at different stages of a project, such as at the 
architecture stage, at the requirement stage, or with a system sketch. LINDDUN consist 
of a summary of privacy concepts,  several sets of check lists and privacy-enhancing 
technologies list.  
 
The LINDDUN methodology [Deng et al., 2010] is inspired by a security framework, 
STRIDE [2002], and evaluated and supplymented by Kim Wuyts in 2015. Kim Wuyts 
and her group made two empirical expirements on LINDDUN. The improvements are 
mainly based on the experiments results. In the same year, Kim Wuyts and Wouter 
Joosen publicshed a tutorial for LINDDUN Framework 2.0 [Wuyts and Joosen, 2015], 
which greately improved the usability of LINDDUN.  
 
The core contributions of LINDDUN are the conceptional  framework and the technical 
process method. Firstly, LINDDUN integrates the definitions of privacy threats and 
privacy properties, and presents the related check lists, which are helpful to check 
potential threats. The name, LINDDUN, is an abbreviation of seven privacy threat 
types: Linkability, Identifiability, Non-repudiation, Detectability, Disclosure of 
information, content Unawareness, as well as policy and consent Noncompliance. On 
the other hand, LINDDUN presents a guide line to scan a system privacy claws. The 
LINDDUN methodology offers a new approach for privacy requirement analysts and 
engineers to model privacy threats and elicit privacy requirements from a system. 
 
 
 15 
3. A privacy threats model – LINDDUN 
3.1. Concepts and definitions in LINDDUN  
Danezis[2008] puts forward that privacy can be devided into hard privacy and soft 
privacy. Hard privacy has the similar goal with data minimization, assuming that the 
third party is untrustable, such as the third party service provider or advertiser. A system 
of hard privacy tries to reduce the possible to ”trust” other entities. Soft privacy, on the 
contrary, means that users provides data to the thrid party as much as they need, and 
trust them. It is under the assumption that the data controller is resposible for data 
protection. Besides, privacy mitigation strategy means strateties or measures which 
can mitigate privacy threats. Mitigation technology means technical means to mitigate 
privacy threats.  
 
3.2. LINDDUN procedures  
LINDDUN is a privacy threat analysis methodology that supports analysts to elicit 
privacy requirements from a system stretch. There are 6 primary procedures in 
LINDDUN to elicit privacy requirements. Figure3.1 shows a step-by-step overview of 
the LINDDUN methodology using a simple social network system as a running 
example. The approach divides privacy requirements analysis into two phases. The first 
phase is the identification of privacy threats, and it is conducted in three steps, which 
are considered as the core steps of LINDDUN. The rest three steps are solution-oriented 
and aim at translating the threats, which have been identified, into viable strategies and 
solutions that can mitigate the threats.  
 
Figure 3.1 The LINDDUN methodology steps [Wuyts, 2015] 
Before using LINDDUN methodology, some basic knowledge in LINDDUN, which are 
introduced in previous chapters, such as privacy threat, privacy property and item of 
interests are necessary. At the same time, the analyst needs to be familiar with the 
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system. When all preparations are ready, the analyst can start to analyze the system step 
by step. The first step is to model a data flow diagram (DFD) of the system. Based on 
the analyst’s comprehension to the system, a data flow diagram is created as output of 
step 1. In the second step, the analyst needs to locate all privacy threats associated with 
every data flow diagram element with the help of privacy threat type. The goal in this 
step is to avoid of missing any privacy threats, and remove reduplicative privacy threats. 
A table with key privacy threats marks is created as step 2’s output. The third step is to 
elicit and document threats. LINDDUN has a strong support in this step, called threat 
tree. All threat tree are up to date by LINDDUN researchers. The analyst uses the threat 
tree to get specific privacy threats from step 2’s table. The threat tree is used as a check 
list. Once the analyst gets one specific privacy threat, he documents this privacy threat 
as a misuse case. After this step, a list of misuse cases is supposed to be output of this 
step. Problem-oriented steps stop here. The forth step is to prioritize all privacy threats. 
After all problem-oriented steps, there shall be plenty of privacy threats which need to 
be considered according to the system’s size. Prioritization is necessary to figure out 
which privacy threats are more critical and shall be focused. In next step, a mitigation 
strategy tree is given by LINDDUN methodology to help the analyst to find strategies 
for every privacy threat found in previous steps. Finally, in the last step, a privacy 
enhancing technology list is given to support all strategies. According to these strategies 
and technologies, a list of privacy requirements can be produced in detail. 
 
3.2.1. Model Data flow diagram (DFD) 
The first step of the LINDDUN methodology is to model a data flow diagram for the 
system. The data flow diagram (DFD) is a visual tool to describe logic models and 
expresses data transformation in a system [Li and Chen, 2009]. The data flow diagram 
can illustrate details of the functions a system possesses. Data flow and process can be 
shown simply and clearly in a DFD. Data flow diagram, compared to other diagrams, 
like use case diagram or sequence diagram, has its advantages. In privacy requirements 
elicitation, data shall be the main concern. DFD has advantages especially on 
documenting data flows or exploring a new high-level design in terms of data flow 
[Craig Larman, 2005]. DFD can express all stored data and transferring data in a 
system. It is an appropriate tool for privacy analysis.  
 
A DFD consists of combined by 4 main elements: data input, data flow, data process 
and database. Figure 3.2 is a sample DFD of social network application. There are data 
transmission between users and portal process, portal process and service process, and 
service process and a social network database. There is only one database and one data 
input in this case. 
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Figure 3.2 A sample of data flow diagram [Deng et al., 2010] 
The DFD has its own rules on how to create a standard DFD. The granularity of a DFD 
has a flexible range [Li and Chen, 2009]. A process, also called activity, is the 
transformation of data. It can be further decomposed to form more detailed sub-process. 
For instance, a DFD of a social network can be simply like the example in Figure 3.2. It 
can also be made in details if every service process is regarded as one separated process, 
such as upload process, share process, add friends process, and so on. For another 
instance, a system with two entities shall be more complex than the system with only 
one entity. More elements a DFD has, more complex the DFD is. An analyst shall make 
a clear and correct DFD for a good start. How to create a good DFD? How much details 
shall a good DFD include? About DFD, there is little explanation in Deng and Wuyts’ 
thesis. This shall be a valuable point in the following case study.   
 
3.2.2. Map privacy threats to DFD elements 
The second step is to map privacy threats to DFD elements. In LINDDUN framework, 
all privacy threats are catalogued into 7 types. They are respectively Linkability, 
Identifiability, Non-repudiation, Detectability, Information Disclosure, Content 
Unawareness and Policy/consent Noncompliance. Every DFD element is regarded as an 
independent unit. LINDDUN has done some effort to reduce user’s workload. The 
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crosses in Table 3.1 mark potential privacy threat points that needs to be cared about, 
and the blanks in table means the part that shall not be considered. For example, 
linkability of entity is one point which is supposed to be considered as a privacy threat. 
If two accounts have similar profiles, they might be from the same entity. For another 
example, all DFD elements are parts of the system except for entity, so only entity has 
content awareness in the system. Content unawareness of data flow, data store or 
process does not need to be analyzed in LINDDUN methodology. Further discussion 
about these marks will be talked in next step. 
THREAT CATEGORIES Entity  Data 
Flow 
Data 
Store 
Process 
Linkability  × × × × 
Identifiability × × × × 
Non-repudiation   × × × 
Detectability   × × × 
Information Disclosure  × × × 
Content Unawareness ×    
Policy/consent 
noncompliance  
 × × × 
Table 3.1 Map threats to DFD elements [Deng et al., 2010] 
In a practical case, every DFD element could have multiple units. In Figure 3.2 sample, 
there are 1 entity, 6 data flows, 1 data store and 2 processes. For every entity, there are 3 
potential privacy threat points, and for every other element, the number increases to 6. 
Then, there are 3+18+6+12 = 39 potential privacy threat points in total. Every point is 
one situation which should be analyzed in following steps, and might lead to several 
privacy threats. In order to improve the productivity, unnecessary and repetitive points 
shall be removed. Judgment on whether one case matches on one privacy threat shall 
critically obey the definitions of these privacy threats, which has been introduced in 
previous chapters. A short guide on judgment is given by LINDDUN as a reference: 
 Linkability (L) occurs when one can sufficiently distinguish whether 2 items of 
interest (IOI, such as requests from a user) are related 
 Identifiability (I) occurs when it is possible to pinpoint the identity of a subject 
(e.g., a user) 
 Non-repudiation (Nr) occurs when it is possible to gather evidence so that a 
party cannot deny having performed an action 
 Detectability (D) occurs when one can sufficiently distinguish whether an IOI 
exists, e.g., in a system 
 Disclosure of information (Di) is the exposure of information to individuals who 
are not supposed to have access to it 
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 Unawareness (U) occurs when the user is unaware of the information he is 
supplying to the system and the consequences of his/her act of sharing 
 Non-compliance (Nc) occurs when the system is not compliant with the (data 
protection) legislation, its advertised policies and the existing user consents 
 
Besides above criteria, LINDDUN methodology puts forward other means to minimize 
the number of privacy threat points, called making assumptions. Making assumptions 
means when an analyst use LINDDUN methodology to analyze a system, he/she shall 
make some assumptions according to specific conditions of that system. These 
assumptions always influence privacy threats elicitation more or less. For example, 
linkability and identity of entity are only applicable when the social network system is 
anonymous. If the system is not anonymous, there is no need to protect users’ identity 
information. “The system is anonymous” shall be one useful assumption, and the marks 
of linkability and identity of entity shall be removed. In LINDDUN official tutorial 
[Wuyts and Joosen, 2015], there is another important action: combine “X”s. This 
combine “X”s action is a part of making assumptions. The word “combine” reveals the 
essence of making assumptions: reduce the number of privacy threat points. Making 
assumptions determines which part of the system shall be ignored and which part 
deserves more attention. It greatly affects workload of all analysis processes and final 
result. 
 
3.2.3. Elicit and document threats 
This step contains two parts: eliciting threats and documenting threats.  
 
Elicit threats: After mapping the privacy threats on the system, a table with marks shall 
be ready as the input of next step: eliciting threats. In this step, LINDDUN methodology 
provides a privacy threat tree catalog as a checklist to help analysts continue eliciting 
privacy threats from potential privacy threat points table.  The privacy threat tree catalog 
is supposed to consist of all possible options for any pair of privacy threat and DFD 
element. For each potential privacy threat point in last step, there shall be at least one 
corresponding privacy threat tree for eliciting privacy threats.  
 
The completeness of threat tree effects the completeness of LINDDUN methodology. 
Threat tree shall be up to date along with new privacy threats’ discovering. Present 
version of threat tree has been improved by in Kim Wuyts [Wuyts et al., 2015]. Lastest 
version is available online7. 
 
                                                 
7 https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/~kim.wuyts/LINDDUN/  
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Figure 3.3 Linkability of an entity threat tree [Wuyts et al., 2015] 
Figure 3.3 is a threat tree for linkability of an entity. The first round box is catalog title, 
called root node. Others are leaf nodes. There are two subtrees under this root node. The 
box on left side is a specific situation about how linkability of entity effects on a system. 
Any leaf node under this node is a further discussion about this situation. Besides 
problem descriptions, round box means this node refers to another threat tree. In this 
example, they are information disclosure at data flow and linkability at data store. They 
are root nodes in their own threat trees. Information Disclosure at data flow is a special 
node, whose edge is red in privacy threat tree catalog. It means that this node belongs to 
a security threat tree. Security threat trees are also listed in LINDDUN framework and 
might be used in some cases.  The sexangle box on right side is a subtree, which also 
appears in another threat tree: Linkability of data flow. To avoid duplication, this 
subtree is only shown in linkability of data flow threat tree.  
 
The threat tree can be used as a checklist in privacy threats elicitation. LINDDUN is 
designed to solve generic privacy problems, so all system shall be applicable to these 
treat trees. For an analyst, the only thing is excluding redundant items in threat tree. 
Analyst is firstly supposed to pick one threat tree, then, consider if the system has same 
or similar privacy threats with descriptions in leaf nodes. LINDDUN provides further 
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explanation under every privacy threat tree. Once a privacy threat is elicited, it needs to 
be documented in next step.  
 
Document threats: Another part is to document threats. A threat template is necessary 
to document threats. The misuse case is recommended by LINDDUN to document 
threats. Misuse case can be used to express threats. Conversely the requirements can 
also be elicited from misuse cases. Misuse case is a suitable way to document threats 
once the threats are found. The proposed misuse case structure is shown in Table 3-2 
with a brief explanation as below (optional fields are indicated with *) [Guttorm S. and 
Andreas L. 2001]:  
 
“Summary” is a brief introduction to a threat. It describes a privacy threat with one or 
two sentences. “Assets, stakeholders and threats” means the people who might be 
threaten by this threat. “Primary misactor” means the one who cause this privacy threat, 
and “trigger” is the action made by misactor. “Basic flow” and “alternative flow” are the 
processes of privacy threat cause harm to system or users. “Preconditions” are 
assumptions made by previous steps. “Leaf node” and “root node” are used to located 
the options in privacy threat tree. These nodes are helpful to find mitigation strategies in 
further analysis. “DFD element” reveals the connections between privacy threat and 
data flow diagram. “Leaf node, root node and DFD element” shall be mandatory fields 
in this thesis.  
 
Number and title  
Summary  Provides a brief description of the threat. 
Assets, 
stakeholders 
and threats* 
Describes the assets being threatened, their importance to the 
different stakeholders, and what the potential damage is if the 
misuse case succeeds. 
Primary 
misactor  
Describes the type of misactor performing the misuse case. Possible 
types are insiders, people with a certain technical skill, and so on. 
Also, some misuse cases could occur accidentally whereas other are 
most likely to be performed intentionally. 
Basic flow  Discusses the normal flow of actions, resulting in a successful attack 
for the misactor. 
Alternative 
flow*  
Describes the other ways the misuse can occur. 
Trigger*  Describes how and when the misuse case is initiated. 
Preconditions*  Precondition that the system must meet for the attack to be 
feasible. 
Leaf node(s)*  Refers to the leaf node(s) of the threat tree(s) the threat 
corresponds to. 
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Root node(s)*  Refers to the root node(s) of the threat tree(s) that were examined 
for the threat. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
Lists all DFD elements to which this threat is applicable. 
Remarks*  Although optional, related assumptions shall be mentioned here. 
Table 3-2 A template for miause case [Guttorm S. and Andreas L. 2001]  
After this step, all privacy threats shall be done and documented. That means all 
problem-oriented steps in LINDDUN methodology are finished. Next step is to solve 
these problems and get final target: privacy requirements list. 
 
3.2.4. Threats prioritization 
From this step, the goal is to solve privacy threats, rather than to find and define them. 
In order to solve these privacy threats, it is necessary to figure out how serious a threat 
is. A threats prioritization shall be made according to some measures. It is like a risk 
management in requirement engineering, but the privacy threat is concerned in this 
process. Methods on making prioritization is not mentioned in LINDDUN. The Open 
Web Application Software Project(OWASP) [2015], provides a methodology named 
OWASP Risk Rating Methodology (ORRM). It is taken as an option to do a 
prioritization. 
  
The ORRM approach is based on standard methodologies and customized for 
application security. The most common risk model shall be:  
      Risk = Likelihood * Impact 
Risk is a number that shows the risk of a threat. The higher the number is, the more 
important the threat shall be. Likelihood is a number from 0 to 9 that shows possibility 
of this threat. Impact is a number from 0 to 9 that means if this threat succeeds, how 
much damage it causes. The procedure of ORRM has 6 steps:  
 
Step 1: Identifying a Risk  
When a user starts to rate risks, these risks shall be identified and ready for the 
following work. In this case, all privacy threats shall be identified at the beginning. 
After step 3 of LINDDUN, all privacy threats have been elicited from the system and 
documented with misuse case template. 
 
Step 2: Factors for Estimating Likelihood  
In ORRM, the factor is an important concept to estimate severity. There are eight 
factors which influence the likelihood of one risk, including skill level, motive, 
opportunity, size, ease of discovery, ease of exploit, awareness and intrusion detection. 
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Not all factors are applicable in analysis of the risk of every threat. For different 
projects, selection of factors can be customized. Each factor has a set of options, and 
each option has a rating number from 0 to 9. For example, the first sentence is the 
meaning of this factor. Then, all options are followed with brief descriptions, and 
ordered from high to low. These option points are discontinuous integers. Only one 
option can be selected for one risk. In the end of step 2, the average points of all factors 
presents a likelihood level for each threat. 
 Skill level  
How technically skilled is this group of threat agents? Security penetration skills 
(9), network and programming skills (6), advanced computer user (5), some technical 
skills (3), no technical skills (1)  
 
Step 3: Factors for Estimating Impact  
Factors for estimating impact are similar to likelihood. There are eight factors which 
can influence the impact of one risk. They are loss of confidentiality, loss of integrity, 
loss of availability, loss of accountability, financial damage, reputation damage, non-
compliance and privacy violation. Not all factors are applicable in analysis of the risk of 
every threat. For different projects, selection of factors can be customized. Each factor 
has a set of options, and each option has a rating number from 0 to 9. Reputation 
damage is taken as an example. There are descriptions to factors and options. These 
option points are discontinuous integers and ordered from high to low. Only one option 
can be selected for one risk. In the end of step 3, the average points of all factors 
presents an impact level for each threat. 
 Reputation damage  
Would an exploit result in reputation damage that would harm the business? 
Minimal damage (1), Loss of major accounts (4), loss of goodwill (5), brand damage (9)  
 
Step 4: Determining Severity of the Risk  
There are three levels to estimate likelihood and impact in ORRM as shown in Table 3-
3. Point from 0 to 3, including 3, is rated LOW. Point from 3 to 6, including 6, is rated 
MEDIUM. Point from 6 to 9, including 9, is rated HIGH. All estimated risks shall be 
divided into these three levels, according to the average point of each risk.  
 
Table 3-3 Likelihood and impact levels [OWASP, 2015] 
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Overall risk severity level is influenced by likelihood and impact levels. There are five 
levels for overall risk severity: critical, high, medium, low and note, as shown in Table 
3-4. Finnaly, every risk, or privacy threat will get a severity level. Usually, risks above 
medium shall take more attention compared to other risks.   
 
Table 3-4 Overall risk severity levels [OWASP, 2015] 
 
Step 5: Deciding What to Fix  
There is none instruction in this step. The decision shall be made depends on the result 
and specific situations of the system.  
 
Step 6: Customizing Your Risk Rating Model 
This step makes this risk model more applicable to generic projects. However, there is 
no need to customize this model after prioritization is produced. 
 
3.2.5. Elicit mitigation strategies 
Eliciting mitigation strategy is a process in which privacy threats are turned into privacy 
threat mitigation strategies or privacy requirements. Privacy threat is not the final goal 
of the LINDDUN methodology, and specific solutions are more practical for software 
developers and other stackholders to handle with. In this step, LINDDUN provides a 
guide to lead analysts from the problem to the solution in theory step by step. It shall be 
highlighted that one privacy threat might be connected to a number of requirements, 
vice versa. 
 
In LINDDUN, there is a taxonomy of privacy mitigation strategies, as shown in Figure 
3-4. LINDDUN’s authors divide privacy mitigation strategies into two types: concealing 
association and guarding association. Concealing association usually protects data by 
hiding it or faking it, and tries to make data ignored by attackers. According to the 
protected objective, concealing association has two deeper types: protect ID and protect 
data. Due to the variety of data content, protect data can be further classified. On the 
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other hand, guarding association is a more initiative method compared to concealing 
association. It also has two types as well. Guard exposure tries to protect data from 
exposure. Maximize accuracy makes people aware of data disclosure as early as 
possible. Every item in Figure 3-4 is related to a series of mitigation strategy 
technologies in Table 3-5. The taxonomy of privacy mitigation strategies is greatly 
helpful to find corresponding mitigation strategies for different privacy threats. 
 
Figure 3-4 Taxonomy of privacy mitigation strategies [Wuyst, et al., 2015] 
 
 
Table 3-5 Mapping of mitigation strategies to threat tree  [Wuyst, et al., 2015] 
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A table provided by LINDDUN shows how to find proper mitigation strategy for each 
privacy threat, as shown in Table 3-5. For instance, if a privacy threat refers to the 
unawareness of an entity, it shall belong to U_2 situation. The strategies could be 
maximize accuracy and review data. Every privacy threat from previous work shall be 
located in this table. It offer specific minds to solve privacy problems, and it leads to 
specific solutions, privacy enhancing technologies.  
 
3.2.6. Select privacy enhancing technologies (PETs8) 
After 5 steps, a list of privacy threats and corresponding mitigation strategies shall be 
ready. Finding mitigation technologies is also a part of LINDDUN. This is also a part of 
LINDDUN methodology. There are common solutions or strategies to meet privacy 
requirements: 
1. Warn the user could be a valid strategy for lower risk threats. However, user is the 
one who makes decisions. Only warning the user cannot sufficiently solve privacy 
problems. 
2. Removing or turning off the feature can completely remove privacy threats. If the 
feature has more risks than benefits, the best action is to give up this feature. This 
also working for privacy problems. Nothing will be disclosed if user hasn’t shared 
anything.  
3. Countering threats with either preventive or reactive privacy enhancing technology 
is the most commonly used strategy to solve privacy issues. 
 
In order to solve the practical problems, privacy enhancing technologies are necessary. 
The LINDDUN methodology provides a table which offers the relationship between 
mitigation strategies and privacy enhancing technologies. Privacy enhancing technology 
list is available and live update online.  Considering that specific technology is not key 
point in this thesis, introduction to privacy enhancing technology is omitted. Analyst 
can find corresponding technologies in this table, according to strategy of each privacy 
threat. Then, translate these strategies and technologies into documented privacy 
requirements. So far, the procedure of applying LINDDUN to a system is finished.  
 
                                                 
8  PET, Annual symposium on privacy enhancing technologies (PETs), available as: 
http://petsymposium.org/    
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4. Apply LINDDUN to the Rin-Tin-Tinder project: A case study 
4.1. Purpose and hypothesis 
The research objective of this thesis is to figure out how practically we can apply the 
LINDDUN methodology in privacy requirements analysis. In this chapter, the author 
will apply the LINDDUN methodology to the Rin-Tin-Tinder (RTT) system. The 
workshop result and the Microsoft privacy guideline will be involved as assists. The 
number of privacy threats and privacy requirements from the LINDDUN methodology 
and if most of them are consistent with other methods, such as the Microsoft privacy 
guideline, are two key points which shall be focused. The number of LINDDUN privacy 
threats will be compared with the number of workshop privacy threats. On the other 
hand, the Microsoft privacy guideline is a good reference to verify the correctness of 
LINDDUN privacy requirements. A privacy requirement is regarded as correct if there 
is a similar guide or rule in the Microsoft privacy guideline. Then, the objectives of the 
case study is twofold, and they are 1) the LINDDUN analysis provides a systematic way 
to identify privacy threats and to elicit privacy requirements for software applications, 
compared with the requirements elicitation techniques such as workshop; 2) the elicited 
requirements are consistent with the Microsoft privacy guideline. 
 
4.2. Introduction to the case: Rin-Tin-Tinder 
Rin-Tin-Tinder(RTT) is a social web application. It is a project from Demola9. The 
RTT team consists of 5 developers from university, one facilitor from Demola 
community, and one client from a Finnish company. I am involved in this project as a 
developer.  
 
                                                 
9 Demola is an international organization that facilitates co-creation projects between university 
students and companies, either locally or internationally. Link to Demola: http://www.demola.net/   
 28 
 
Figure 4-1 A screenshot of the Rin-Tin-Tinder web application 
RTT is created for dog owners. The goal of RTT is to create a dog owner community. In 
this community, every dog owner can make friends with others, communicate with each 
other, get dog training instuctions from dog trainers or dog experts, and buy dog 
products online, including dog training courses. All these features are combined 
together to build a dog owners version Facebook. RTT is designed to be a social 
network website application. A demo of the RTT web application is available online10:  
As a social network site, RTT has many features. A use case diagram presents most 
features in Figure 4-2. There are two kinds of users in the RTT system: Content 
provider user and normal user. Normal user, as main object of the RTT service, are 
supposed to be dog owners. They can use the sociality feature just like other social 
network websites, such as login, logout, edit profile, share status and Q&A. They can 
also import profile or pictures from other websites, buy dog online courses or other 
products in the RTT webstore, or check in on the map when they run their dogs. On the 
other hand, content provider user acts as an administrator of RTT system. They are from 
the RTT running team. Besides basic login and sociality services, content provider user 
shall push notifications and update web store products for normal user.   
                                                 
10 Link to Rin-Tin-Tinder: http://rintintinder.herokuapp.com  
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Figure 4-2 Use case Diagram of the Rin-Tin-Tinder web application 
The developer team needs to consider about privacy issues before the system releases. 
While this thesis was writing, the RTT project was on its design stage. The structure of 
the RTT system is clear, but the coding work haven’t completely done. It is a proper 
time to analyze privacy requirements for the RTT system. Besides, three developers of 
the RTT development group had workshop to identify privacy threats from the system, 
which is another reason that the RTT system is choosen.  
 
4.3. Methods used without LINDDUN  
4.3.1. Workshop  
Before LINDDUN is applied for the RTT project, the development group did a 
workshop to identify privacy threats. A workshop is a meeting in which a group of 
people apply methodologies for a certain subject, in order to achieve a result. A 
workshop always needs a topic. It can be a speech given by several people, it also can 
be only a meeting for solving specific problems. 
 
The author owned and facilitated this workshop. There are three participants from the 
RTT project development group in this workshop. One of them plays as scribe during 
the workshop. They are all undergraduates from University of Tampere, and their 
majors are all related to information science. Participants are requested to come up with 
as many privacy threats as possible for the RTT system. There are three participants 
involving in this workshop. They are developers from the RTT project group. They are 
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familiar with the RTT system, but they do not know LINDDUN. When the workshop is 
held, the RTT project is on its architecture phrase, which is a perfect timing to start 
analyzing privacy requirements. In this workshop, participants followed the author’s 
suggestion, using data flow diagram as an assist.  
 
The procedure of the workshop is as below: 
1. Before the workshop starts, three participants are asked to create a data flow 
diagram of the RTT system, according to the RTT system features; 
2. After the data flow diagram is done, brief introduction to privacy threat is 
provided to participants as basic knowledge for follwing steps; 
3. Participants are required to identify privacy threats as many as possible in a two 
hours meeting;  
4. Participants are required to sort privacy threats and abandon incorrect privacy 
threats. 
 
4.3.2. Workshop result 
After two hours workshop meeting, two output are produced. The first one is a data 
flow diagram, as shown in Figure 4-3. This data flow diagram has 2 entities, 7 
processes, 13 data flows and 4 data stores. This is a simplified data flow diagram, using 
non-arrow lines. All data flows are not clarified clearly in this diagram.  
 
Figure 4-3 A data flow diagram by the RTT developer group workshop 
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Except for the data flow diagram, another result is a privacy threat list shown in Table 
4-1.  These threats are all put forward by participants with the help of DFD in Figure 4-
3. It cost three participants around 30 minutes to create the DFD, and around 90 minutes 
to find 11 privacy threats for the RTT system. These threats are problems which might 
happen to the RTT system so far for the RTT developer group.  
 
These privacy threats from workshop are not described with much detail. After the DFD 
is done, participants try to come up with all possible threats in every process, and record 
them all. All participants do not use any techniques except their brains. Finally, Table 4-
1 is produced as another result of the workshop.   
 
Threats  Misactor  
W01: Infected browser is used.  Skilled outsider 
W02: Hijack the RTT website, to make an infected 
version. 
Skilled outsider 
W03: Someone can get user’s location, and use user’s 
location data to violate user’s real assets.   
Skilled outsider 
W04:  Identity thief.  Skilled outsider 
W05: Hacking into user’s account or/ and Facebook 
account.   
Skilled outsider 
W06: Stalking, people would follow users and their dogs 
according to their posts.  
Unskilled or 
intentional 
insider 
W07: Kidnapping, people would follow users and their 
dogs according to their posts.   
Unskilled or 
intentional 
insider 
W08: People give false instructions to the RTT system.  Intentional 
insider  
W09: Direct attack to mongo database. Skilled outsider 
W10: Disputes in the RTT develop team.  Skilled insider  
W11: DDOS-attack.   Skilled outsider 
Table 4-1 Privacy threats list of RTT 
4.3.3. Interview  
Besides workshop, an interview is made as another means to collect data. Interview is a 
kind of conversation where one person ask questions and one person answers questions. 
The one asks questions is interviewer and the other one is interviewee. The questions 
are often designed in advance. Interview is a common method to understand people’s 
opinions.  
 
After the workshop, participants answered some interview questions. The interview 
questions are attached as appendix at the end of this thesis. Interview questions are 
mainly focused on participants’ subjective feelings about the workshop and their 
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evaluation to their own work. A few points in these answers shall be highlighted, which 
might be helpful to analyze the result. 
 
All participants are satisfied with the final result. Two of them give a 5 out of 5, and one 
gives a 4 out of 5. Participants think they find valuable privacy threats during this 
workshop. The second point is that, all participants indicate they have no idea whether 
they can get valuable findings in the workshop. Two participants said that the most 
difficult part is to start it at the beginning. That reveals the value of the DFD in this 
workshop. DFD is a description of the system. It contributes a lot to identify privacy 
threats. However, in this workshop, it is assigned as a task according to the workshop 
owner’s knowledge. Is it the only option, or the best option to represent the system? It 
needs further discussions, which will be made in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4. Procedure of LINDDUN step by step  
4.4.1. Brief process of applying the LINDDUN methodology 
As shown in Figure 3-1, there are six processes to apply the LINDDUN methodology to 
a system. The first step is to model a data flow diagram (DFD) of the system. Then, the 
analyst needs to locate all privacy threats associated with every data flow diagram 
element with the help of privacy threat types. The third step is to elicit and document 
privacy threats. LINDDUN has a strong support in this step, called threat tree. The 
analyst uses the threat tree as a check list to get specific privacy threats from last step. 
Once the analyst gets one specific privacy threat, he documents this privacy threat as a 
misuse case. A list of misuse cases is supposed to be the output of the third step. The 
forth step is to prioritize all privacy threats. Privacy threats with high risks are selected 
to be solved in next step. A mitigation strategy tree is given by the LINDDUN 
methodology as a strong support. It is used to help the analyst to find strategies for 
every privacy threat selected from last step. Finally, a privacy enhancing technology list 
offers solid techniques to match all strategies. According to these strategies and 
technologies, a list of privacy requirements can be produced in details. 
 
4.4.2. Model data flow diagram of RTT 
The importance of data flow diagram has been discussed in previous chapters. In this 
case study, the author created the data flow diagram of the RTT system according to the 
RTT project resources. Following analysis and discussions are all based on this data 
flow diagram of the RTT system, which is shown in Figure 4-4.   
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Figure 4-4 A data flow diagram of the RTT system 
The data flow diagram of the RTT system contains 2 entities: the content provider user 
and the normal user. The content provider user is someone who updates the RTT 
website. The normal user is someone who get the RTT services. Besides, there are 8 
processes, 4 data stores and 34 data flows. Limited to diagram size, descriptions of data 
flows are listed in Table 4-2. Some data flows in this table are users’ PII. Some data 
flows, such as location information and payment information are PII which is created by 
the system. Besides, transaction data can be turned into PII, like import data request. So 
every data flow in this DFD shall be protected. This data flow diagram is based on data 
transferring in the RTT system. For example, when a normal user tries to use RTT to 
buy online dog training courses, he firstly logs in the RTT system. Through login 
process, he provides his identifier with data flow 3, and he gets permission with data 
flow 4 to use the RTT service. Then, he opens the RTT web store page to select what he 
needs. After that, he pays for the online course and gets what he bought. Data flow 9 is 
lookup and selection information from user, and data flow 19 is the information of 
user’s credit card. Data flow 10 is the product information after this shopping action, 
and data flow 20 means a confirmation from payment system. On the other hand, data 
flow 33 and 34 are some transactions between the RTT system and bank system. One 
point needs to be highlighted is that login process is a special process in this data flow 
diagram. This is the first process for all users when they do communication with the 
RTT system, like a portal for user. It means that users need to get information from a 
certain process, which is impossible in a practical situation. Besides login process, data 
flow 1, 2, 3 and 4 might contain all information which other data flows contain. 
 34 
Considered that content provider users are different from normal users, they have their 
own login process.  
Data 
flow 
Information description Data 
flow 
Information description 
1 Identifier and almost all information 
this user provides to the RTT system. 
2 Grant after confirmation and almost 
all information the RTT system 
provides to this user. 
3 Identifier and almost all information 
this user provides to the RTT system. 
4 Grant after confirmation and almost 
all information the RTT system 
provides to this user. 
5 New web store updates information 6 Last web store version review 
7 New PII 8 Other users’ PII 
9 Lookup and selections information 10 Products information 
11 New PII 12 Other users’ PII 
13 Location information and usage 
permission  
14 Location information  
15 Import data permission 
(Authorization)  
16 3rd party data confirmation  
17 New web store updates information 18 Last web store version review 
19 Credit card information 20 Payment confirmation  
21 Shopping records 22 Updated products information 
23 New PII 24 Other users’ PII 
25 Location records 26 Location records review   
27 Location request  28 Location information  
29 3rd party data records  30 3rd party data review 
31 Import data request  32 3rd party data   
33 Payment transaction information  34 Payment transaction information  
Table 4-2 Data flow descriptions 
There is a dashed box, which is not a part of data flow diagram in this data flow 
diagram. That is the boundary of the RTT system. The data stores out of this boundary 
are not belong to the RTT system and shall be omitted. 
 
4.4.3. Map privacy threats to DFD elements 
Mapping privacy threats to DFD elements means to create a table which contains all 
potential privacy threat points for every DFD element. The result of mapping privacy 
threats to DFD elements is shown in Table 4-3. The crosses in this table mean all 
potential privacy threat points for the RTT system so far. These points need to be further 
discussed in following steps. 
 
Threat target L I  N   D   D   U  N  
Entity  Content provider user, e1 × ×    ×  
User , e2 × ×    ×  
Data 
flow 
Df1 × × × × ×  × 
Df2 × × × × ×  × 
Df3 × × × × ×  × 
… . . . . .  . 
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Df34 × × × × ×  × 
Process  Login(c), p1 × × × × ×  × 
Login(u), p2 × × × × ×  × 
Update web store, p3 × × × × ×  × 
Online shopping , p4 × × × × ×  × 
Sociality activities, p5 × × × × ×  × 
Use location service, p6 × × × × ×  × 
Use 3rd party service, p7 × × × × ×  × 
3rd party online payment, p8 × × × × ×  × 
Data 
store  
  
Mongo database, ds1 × × × × ×  × 
Bank database, ds2 × × × × ×  × 
Google map database, ds3 × × × × ×  × 
Third-party database, ds4 × × × × ×  × 
Table 4-3 Map LINDDUN to threats DFD elements of RTT 
Making assumptions is helpful to reduce the number of potential privacy threat points. 
It is greatly influenced by the system features. With the help of the LINDDUN official 
tutorial [Wuyts and Joosen, 2015] and the use case diagram of the RTT system, 
assumptions in Table 4-4 are made. There are some assumptions are made directly 
according to the LINDDUN tutorial. A1, A2 and A3 are stated here, because that the 
‘X’s is the same when it involves the same type of data. A6, A7, A8, A9, A10 and A11 
are optional assumptions to general systems. Linkability and identifiability are only 
applicable to anonymous systems, and non-repudiation and detectability are only 
applicable to the systems with e-voting or whistleblowing activities. A12 is based on the 
rule that all ‘X’s related to processes can usually be determined as not applicable to the 
system. A13 and A15 are directly recorded in the LINDDUN tutorial and they are 
applicable to all systems. All assumptions above are based on the LINDDUN tutorial. 
The rest assumptions: A4, A5 and A14 are made by the author’s analysis to the RTT 
system. Some assumptions are called general assumptions, such as A1, A2, A3, A4, A9, 
A12, A13 and A15, as they are applicable for most systems. The rest assumptions are 
only applicable for certain systems. The suggestions on how to make assumption are 
unclear and not summarized well either in tutorial or in Wuyts’ thesis. The analyst 
might be confused. This is a point which can be improved in LINDDUN. It is valuable 
to further discuss it in chapter 5.  
 
A1. All internal processes are processing in a similar way. It can be assumed that the 
RTT system is mainly threaten by outside threats, all internal processes can be handled as 
one. 
A2. All data flows between internal processes, and between internal processes and 
internal data stores, are processing in a similar way. It can be assumed that the RTT 
system is mainly threaten by outside threats. All internal data flows can be handled as one. 
A3. All data flows between internal processes and external data stores are processing in 
a similar way. All these data flows can be handled as one. 
A4. Data flows between an entity and a process, and between process and data store are 
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not trusted 
A5. Internal data stores are not considered confidential. Mongo database, as a database 
service, shall not be trusted. 
A6. Linkability and identifiability of content seller is not applicable. The information of 
the company public account is necessary to be real and public. 
A7. Linkability and identifiability of user can be susceptible if users use nick name 
instead of real identity, or the user want to hide part of their information. The RTT system 
can be anonymous. Linkability and identifiability of user might be a threat in the RTT 
system. 
A8. Linkability and identifiability of content seller to portal data flow is not applicable, 
because of assumption 7.  
A9. As linkability and identifiability of data flows and processes have similar threats 
and solutions in the RTT system, they can be handled as one. A distinction between these 
two threats of data flows and processes will therefore not be made. 
A10. Non-repudiation is not applicable in the RTT system. There is no e-voting or 
whistleblowing activities in the RTT system. So as a social network application, users 
shall not deny their usage of the RTT service. 
A11. Detectability is not applicable in the RTT system. For a social network web 
application, users are not supposed to deny their usage of the RTT service. However, it is 
possible for users to use other third party services. The data flow between the RTT system 
and third-party data stores, like payment transaction, have to be considered as a 
detectability threat. The solution to this problem shall be connected to information 
disclosure of data flow. 
A12. Disclosure of information is not applicable to internal processes. Internal processes 
are assumed protected well. As the same reason, it is not applicable to data flows within 
internal processes.  
A13. Disclosure of information is not a privacy threat in LINDDUN, but a security threat 
in STRIDE.  So when it comes to disclosure of information threats, the corresponding 
security threat trees will be used instead of privacy threat trees.  
A14. Content unawareness of two entities are pretty similar on problem and solution. A 
distinction between the two entities will therefore not be made. 
A15. Non-compliance is an important threat, however, it is not specific to one part of the 
system, but poses to the system as a whole. A distinction between the different DFD 
elements for this threat will therefore not be made. 
Table 4-4 Assumptions of the RTT system  
 
According to these assumptions, meaningless potential privacy threat points are 
removed, and similar potential privacy threat points are combined. A new privacy 
threats table is produced as shown in Table 4-5. There are totally 11 potential privacy 
threat points in this table. Each number stands for one point which shall be noticed in 
threats eliciting. This LINDDUN threat table presents a warning list to LINDDUN 
analysts. It is not supposed to find only one privacy threat for every number. Each threat 
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might be connected to several point numbers. On the contrary, every point number 
might be related to plural threats, or even none. These assumptions shall be fixed after 
this table is done. However, if there is something unclear in following steps, more 
assumptions shall be added to make things clear and definite.   
 
Threat target L I  N   D   D   U  N  
Entity  Content provider user, e1      3  
User , e2 1 2    3  
Data 
flow 
Df1, 2     4  11 
Df3, 4 5 5   4  11 
Internal data flows between processes 
(df5-df16, df19 and df20) 
      11 
Data flows between process and 
internal data store (df17, df18, df21-
df26, df29 and df30) 
6 6   4  11 
Data flows between process and 
external data stores (df27, df28 and 
df31-df34)  
6 6  7 4  11 
Process  Internal processes (all)     8  11 
Data 
store  
  
Mongo database, ds1 9 9   10  11 
Table 4-5 Simplified LINDDUN threat table after combine “X”s 
 
4.4.4. Elicit and document threats 
On the basis of potential privacy threat points list, next step is to elicit and document 
privacy threats with threat tree. Threat tree is one contribution given by LINDDUN to 
help analyst to elicit privacy threats from potential privacy threat points. It is live 
updated online11 [Wuyts et al., 2015]. Misuse case template is used as the template to 
document threats.  
 
The process to elicit privacy threats is introduced in previous chapters. According to last 
step’s result, there are 11 potential privacy threat points and every point is related to one 
or two privacy threat tree. First potential privacy threat point is taken as an example to 
show how these privacy threats are elicited and documented from potential privacy 
threat points with the help of privacy threat tree. 
 
A privacy threat tree shall be used as a checklist. First potential privacy threat point is 
linkability of normal user. Its corresponding privacy threat tree is shown in Figure 3-3. 
In Figure 3-3, “linkable login using untrusted communication (L_e1)” is a possible 
                                                 
11 https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/linddun/catalog.php  
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problem for the RTT social network. Its leaf nodes: linkable login and untrusted 
communication, shall be both privacy threats to the RTT system. Log in is a basic 
feature for the RTT social network system in the RTT use case diagram. A normal user 
of the RTT service might use fixed username and password combination for several 
social network accounts, and once one of them leaks, all other account are in danger. 
Therefore, first threat shall be login threat, and further details shall be discussed 
according to the RTT system implementation. Secondly, untrusted communication can 
be caused by different reasons. Besides information disclosure of data flow and 
linkability of data store, another one is that the information receiver is not trustable. In 
this case study, the RTT system needs to collect users’ information for the RTT service, 
such as dog’s name, age, brand, some pictures, and so on. The information receiver is 
the company who runs the RTT services. If they are not trustworthy, the information is 
not secured. Then, second privacy threat is untrustworthy information receiver threat. 
Review these two leaf nodes with more details, then two privacy threat are elicited, and 
documented as shown in Table 4-6 and Table 4-7.   
 
Finally, 15 privacy threats are elicited and documented, and they are attached in 
Appendix 1. The problem-oriented step, as described in previous chapters, is the core of 
LINDDUN. Up to this step, all problem-oriented procedures have been finished.  
 
 
 
Threat 01. Login threat.   
Summary  Users’ login information (account ID, password, profile…) is linkable 
to other logins, or too specific which could be an identity, or too 
much information contained in login process. The account will be 
linkable to other services. 
Primary 
misactor  
User. 
Basic flow  Bf1: Users use fixed information as id (or password, profile…) to 
login.  
Bf2: Potential attackers find similar ID or related information, then 
get more information which should not be open. 
Consequence: Potential attackers get more misactors’ information 
than expected. 
Leaf node(s)*  L_e2, L_e4, L_e5 
Root node(s)*  Linkability of entity, identifiability of entity  
DFD 
element(s)*  
Normal user  
Table 4-6 Threat 0. Login threat. 
 
Threat 02. Untrustworthy information receiver threat..   
Summary  Information receivers (service provider), or a part of users are not 
trustable.  
 39 
Primary 
misactor  
User, information receiver. 
Basic flow  Bf1: Users provide information.  
Bf2: The information is disclosed by misactor.  
Consequence: Potential attackers get users’ information through 
misactor. 
Leaf node(s)*  L_e3, L_e6, I_e3, I_e6 
Root node(s)*  Linkability of entity, identifiability of entity, non-compliance.  
DFD 
element(s)*  
Normal user  
Table 4-7 Threat02. Untrustworthy information receiver threat 
4.4.5. Threats prioritization 
After three problem-oriented steps, LINDDUN elicits 15 threats from the RTT system. 
Next step is to make prioritization. The OWASP Risk Rating Methodology (ORRM) 
[2015] is chosen as a method to estimate the severity of all of these threats in this thesis.   
 
Step 1. Identifying a Risk: After first three steps, 15 threats are elicited from the RTT 
system, as shown in Table 4-8. 
 
 
 
 
Threats  
L01: Login threat.  
L02: Untrustworthy information receiver threat. 
L03: Too much information sharing threat.  
L04: Unawareness storage of information.  
L05: Spoofing a user of the RTT system by falsifying credentials.  
L06: Spoofing a user of the RTT system by eavesdropping communication.  
L07: Credential is disclosed.  
L08: Communication session token is disclosed. 
L09: Information disclosure of internal process. 
L10: Communication content is disclosed.  
L11: Communication with third party is not protected.  
L12: Third party is untrustworthy.  
L13: Database is untrustworthy. 
L14: Incorrect or insufficient privacy policies.  
L15: Non-compliance insider actions.  
Table 4-8 Privacy threats list for the RTT system 
 
Threats Skill 
level 
Moti
ve 
Oppor
-tunity 
Size  Ease 
of 
disco
very 
Ease of 
exploit 
Aware
-ness  
Intru
sion 
detect
ion 
Averag
e  
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L01 1 1 9 9 7 5 4 8 5.5 
L02 1 4 0 2 3 9 1 9 3.625 
L03 1 1 9 9 9 9 1 8 6.875 
L04 1 1 9 9 3 5 4 3 4.325 
L05 9 9 7 2 3 5 6 3 5.5 
L06 9 9 7 2 3 5 6 3 5.5 
L07 5 9 4 2 3 5 4 3 4.325 
L08 9 9 4 2 3 5 4 1 4.625 
L09 3 4 4 2 3 5 1 1 2.875 
L10 9 9 4 2 3 5 4 1 4.625 
L11 9 9 4 2 3 5 4 1 4.625 
L12 1 4 0 2 3 9 1 9 3.625 
L13 9 9 7 2 3 9 6 3 6 
L14 5 4 9 4 3 3 4 1 4.125 
L15 3 4 4 2 1 9 1 1 3.125 
Table 4-9 The likelihood point of threats 
Step 2. Factors for Estimating Likelihood: In order to estimate likelihood, a series of 
factors shall be taken into consideration. In OWASP Risk Rating Methodology 
(ORRM), every factor is influenced by a set of options, and ORRM rate these options 
from 0 to 9. Eight factors in ORRM are taken into consideration in this case study: skill 
level, motive, opportunity, size, ease of discovery, ease of exploit, awareness, intrusion 
detection. According to ORRM’s rating descriptions [OWASP, 2015], every threat get 
an average point of likelihood, as shown in following Table 4-9. 
 
Step 3. Factors for Estimating Impact: According to OWASP Risk Rating 
Methodology, in order to estimate impact, a series of factors shall be taken into 
consideration. Every factor is influenced by a set of options, and in ORRM, these 
options are rated from 0 to 9. Social network is kindly different from normal 
information system, and privacy threats risking is not totally the same with security 
threats, so following 4 factors are selected in our model: loss of confidentiality, loss of 
accountability, reputation, privacy violation size. According to ORRM online guides, 
every threat can get a final average point of impact, as shown in following table. 
Threats Loss of 
confidenti
ality 
Loss of 
accounta
bility  
Reputation 
damage 
Privacy 
violation size 
Average  
L01 9 9 1 3 5.5 
L02 9 1 9 9 7 
L03 7 9 1 5 5.5 
L04 6 9 4 7 6.5 
L05 9 7 5 5 6.5 
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L06 9 7 5 5 6.5 
L07 9 7 4 7 6.75 
L08 2 7 4 5 4.5 
L09 6 7 5 3 5.25 
L10 2 7 4 5 4.5 
L11 2 7 1 7 4.25 
L12 9 1 4 9 5.75 
L13 9 7 9 9 8.5 
L14 2 7 9 5 5.75 
L15 6 1 9 7 5.75 
Table 4-10 The impact point of threats 
 
Step 4. Determining Severity of the Risk: According to point table in ORRM, point in 
(0, 3] can be rated LOW, point in (3, 6] can be rated MEDIUM, and point in (6, 9] can 
be rated HIGH, as shown in Table 3-3. Combine likelihood and impact table, final 
severity has five ranks: CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW and NOTE, as shown in 
Table 3-4. According to the points of every privacy threat, the ranked threat list is 
shown in Table 4-11. 
 
 
 
Threats  Likelihood Impact  Overall 
Severity  
L13: Database is untrustworthy. HIGH HIGH CRITICAL 
L02: Untrustworthy information receiver 
threat 
MEDIUN HIGH HIGH 
L03: Too much information sharing threat  HIGH MEDIUN HIGH 
L04: Unawareness storage of information  MEDIUN HIGH HIGH 
L05: Spoofing a user of the RTT system by 
falsifying credentials.  
MEDIUN HIGH HIGH 
L06: Spoofing a user of the RTT system by 
eavesdropping communication.  
MEDIUN HIGH HIGH 
L07: Credential is disclosed.  MEDIUN HIGH HIGH 
L01: Login threat MEDIUM MEDIUN MEDIUM 
L08: Communication session token is 
disclosed.  
MEDIUN MEDIUN MEDIUM 
L10: Communication content is disclosed.  MEDIUN MEDIUN MEDIUM 
L11: Communication with third party is not 
protected.  
MEDIUN MEDIUN MEDIUM 
L12: Third party is untrustworthy.  MEDIUN MEDIUN MEDIUM 
L14: Incorrect or insufficient privacy 
policies  
MEDIUN MEDIUN MEDIUM 
L15: Non-compliance insider actions  MEDIUN MEDIUN MEDIUM 
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L09: Information disclosure of internal 
process.  
LOW MEDIUN LOW 
Table 4-11 The overall severity of threats 
Step 5. Deciding What to Fix: In this case study, only threats which are rated HIGH or 
CRITICAL are selected to be solved. Finally, first seven threats in Table 4-10 are 
decided to be analyzed in further analysis.  
 
Step 6. Customizing Your Risk Rating Model: Risk rating model is not a study 
objective in this thesis. The result produced by previous work is enough to continue 
following analysis in this case study. Customizing model is not discussed. 
 
4.4.6. Elicit mitigation strategies  
After threats prioritization, 15 privacy threats are elicited from the RTT system, and 7 of 
them are selected as targets to be focused. They are L02, L03, L04, L05, L06, L07 and 
L13. Finally, a privacy requirements list, in which there are 7 privacy requirements, is 
produced to solve selected privacy threats. L13 is taken as an example here. The root 
nodes of this threat are L_ds, I_ds and ID_ds. According to Table 3-5, the mitigation 
strategy to information disclosure of data store is confidentiality in guard exposure 
catalog. Then, from Figure 3-4, the system shall use access control and encryption to 
ensure the security of the data store, which is the first requirement R01 in the 
requirements list. This privacy requirements list almost covers all privacy mitigation 
strategies in the taxonomy of privacy mitigation strategies. Due to the universality of the 
RTT system, this result is also valuable to other social network sites or applications. 
The list in Figure 4-12 is one important contribution of this thesis. What’s more, the 
final step of LINDDUN: Selecting privacy enhancing technologies, is not the focuses of 
this thesis, and is not discussed. 
 
Requirement 
ID 
Threat 
ID 
Requirement definition 
R01 L13, 
L07 
The system shall have access control or encryption for 
database protection. 
R02 L13 The system shall minimize user data on the database.  
R03 L02, 
L03 
The system shall protect user’s ID by pseudonyms or other 
means. 
R04 L03, 
L04 
The system shall have feedback awareness tools; 
The system shall have friendly privacy support as default 
setting. 
R05 L04 User data which is collected and used by the system shall 
be clear and accessible to user. 
R06 L05, 
L06 
The system shall hide user data when it stores or transfers 
user data, and shall remove the data once the data is 
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outdated. 
R07 L05, 
L06 
The system shall protect transactional data by strictly 
obeying protocols and rules in transactions, or removing 
the data once the data is outdated.  
Table 4-12 Privacy requirements list of the RTT system 
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5. Discussions  
5.1. Verification of the results   
The LINDDUN methodology and the workshop produced two privacy threats lists. List 
L is from the LINDDUN methodology and list W is from the workshop. The correctness 
and completeness of list L and list W shall be discussed in this section. 
 
Limited to the author’s knowledge, it is hard to verify the correctness of all threats in 
two lists. But there is a way to narrow the number of threats which shall be focused. The 
Microsoft privacy guideline is used as a reference in this verification. If there is at least 
one rule or suggestion, which solves the threat, this threat is regarded as a valuable one. 
The threats which are not mentioned in the Microsoft privacy guideline need further 
discussions. As shown in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2, 10 threats in list L and 7 threats in 
list W can get corresponding guides in the Microsoft privacy guideline. These 17 are 
considered correct privacy threats to the RTT system.   
 
Threats 
in list L 
Guides in the Microsoft privacy guideline 
L01  Scenario3. Must provide user with prominent notice, and get explicit 
consent prior to collection. 
Should be provided in the UI, not license agreement. 
L03  Scenario1. Should use data validation controls to filter out inconsistent, 
incomplete or incorrect PII.  
Scenario6. Must store minimum amount of data, for the shortest amount 
of time necessary to achieve business purpose. 
L04  Scenario6. Must provide a secure mechanism for users to access and 
correct stored PII. 
L05,06,07  Scenario6. Must authenticate users via a company-approved process 
before collecting, displaying, or modifying PII or contact preferences. 
Must store PII using appropriate security mechanisms to help prevent 
unauthorized access. 
Must restrict PII access to those with a need to know, and revoke access 
when no longer needed. 
L11,12  Scenario7. Provide separate explicit Opt-In consent mechanism. 
Provide link to third party privacy statement. 
 
L13 Scenario7. Discoverable Notice is required. 
 
Table 5-1 Corresponding guides of List L 
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Threats in 
List W 
Guides in the Microsoft privacy guideline 
W01  Scenario1. Should not use methods of form submission that potentially 
expose data in a web form intended for or likely to result in the 
collection of PII. 
Must provide prominent notice and get explicit opt-in consent at any 
point prior to transfer. 
W03,06,07 Scenario7. Provide separate explicit Opt-In consent mechanism. 
Scenario6. Must store minimum amount of data, for the shortest 
amount of time necessary to achieve business purpose. 
Must provide a secure mechanism for users to access and correct 
stored PII. 
W04, 05  Scenario6. Must authenticate users via a company-approved process 
before collecting, displaying, or modifying PII or contact preferences. 
Must store PII using appropriate security mechanisms to help prevent 
unauthorized access. 
Must restrict PII access to those with a need to know, and revoke 
access when no longer needed. 
W09 Scenario7. Discoverable Notice is required. 
 
Table 5-2 Corresponding guides of List W 
The rest threats in list L are L02, L08, L09, L10, L14 and L15, and the rest threats in list 
W are W02, W08, W10 and W11. These threats need be analyzed with a comparison. A 
comparison table is shown in Table 5-3.  
 
ID Related threats in 
list L 
ID Related threats 
in list W 
W01 L01 L01 W01 
W02 X1 L02 X5 
W03 L03, 04 L03 W03, 06, 07 
W04 L05, 06 L04 W03, 06, 07 
W05 L07 L05 W04 
W06 L03, 04 L06 W04 
W07 L03, 04 L07 W05 
W08 X1 L08 X2 
W09 L13 L09 X2 
W10 X05 L10 X2 
W11 X0 L11 X3 
  L12 X3 
  L13 W09 
  L14 X4 
  L15 X5 
Table 5-3 Comparison between list L and list W 
This table shows a connection between list L and list W. As we can see, almost all 
threats in list W have at least one correspongding threat in list L, except for W02, W08 
and W11. Similarly, L08, L09, L10, L11, L12 and L14 have no connections to list W. 
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Firstly, W11 which is marked X0 in the table shall be removed. Because a distributed 
denial-of-service attack (DDoS) is a security threat, and is far to privacy disclosure. 
W02 and W08, which are marked as X1, are caused by user’s unintentional actions. 
These actions might lead to privacy disclosure, and deserve to be a privacy threat. W02 
and W08 have no connection with list L, which means this privacy threat might be 
missed by the LINDDUN methodology. X2 means threats related to transactions inside 
a system, including L08, L09, L10. These threats are security threats, but can lead to a 
privacy disclosure. They are valuable privacy threats. L11 and L12 are both threats 
related to third-party. They are mentioned in the Microsoft privacy guideline as valuable 
privacy threats. They are marked X3 as a missing point of list W. L14 is a policy related 
threat. L14 is not mentioned in the Microsoft privacy guideline, but ”notice and 
consent” appears in almost every other threat. L14 is marked X4 as another missing 
point of list W. X5 shows in both lists. It marks the threats which have no connections 
to the Microsoft privacy guideline. W10, L02 and L15 are threats caused by insiders’ 
intentional actions. It shall be removed, because for a social network website like RTT, 
all group members are trustable. X1, X2 and X3 are three types of privacy threats which 
shall be focused after the verification.  
 
THREAT CATEGORIES Entity  Data 
Flow 
Data 
Store 
Process 
Linkability  × × × × 
Identifiability × × × × 
Non-repudiation   × × × 
Detectability   × × × 
Information Disclosure  × × × 
Content Unawareness ×    
Policy/consent 
noncompliance  
√ × × × 
Table 5-4 Modified privacy threats map table 
X1 threat is one meaningful threat in list W. There are two threats marked by X1: W02 
and W08. They are both caused by user’s unintentioanl actions. People might give false 
instructions unintentionally to social network applications. Somethimes, it is harmful to 
uesr’s privacy. The users shall be resposible for this privacy threat. However, if there 
are solutions to solve this privacy threat, engineers and analyst should do so to make 
their systems more reliable. Privacy property of this threat shall be Non-compliance of 
Entity. This privacy threat type is ignored at the beginning. Non-compliance of entity is 
not included in original the LINDDUN potential privacy threat list. Due to the 
incompleteness, non-compliance of entity is regarded as one flaw of the LINDDUN 
framework. A new mark on the privacy threats map means to a series work. A new 
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threat tree related to non-compliance of entity is necessary if this new threat is 
meaningful to the LINDDUN methodology. The constuct of non-compliance of entity 
might be a future work of this thesis. 
 
X1 is the weak point of the LINDDUN methodology, while X2 and X3 reflect the 
advantages of the LINDDUN methodology. Privacy threats marked by X2 are all related 
to transaction data, which refers to internal activities of a system. These activities are 
easily ignored by developers and engineers in privacy requriement analysis. For the 
LINDDUN methodology, all processes and data flows are expressed in the DFD at the 
beginning. Privacy threats marked by X3 are the threats caused by third parties or 
agents. It is another blind spot for some requirements elicitation techniques like 
workshop. Additionally, there are 9 valuable privacy threats out of 11 in list W, from 
W01 to W09. In list L, 13 out of 15 privacy threats are considered valuable, and six of 
them are missed by the workshop. This result matches the first hypothesiss before the 
case study: the LINDDUN methodology provides a systematic way to identify privacy 
threats, and processes more privacy threats than workshop. For the second hypothesis, 
only 9/13 of privacy threats match the Microsoft privacy guideline. It is less than we 
expect.  
 
5.2. Discussion on data flow diagram  
Data flow diagram is important as the first step of LINDDUN. It is the base of latter 
procedures, and it has great influence on the final result. When the author applies the 
LINDDUN methodology to the RTT system, there are two questions at the beginning.:  
1. How much information shall be included in the data flow diagram of the system?  
2. Is data flow diagram the only option for the LINDDUN methodology?  
 
There are two findings from the case study. Firstly, processes and data flows of the RTT 
system can be simplified. In this case study, the author has ever changed the data flow 
diagram in step 2 and step 3. For example, in the use case diagram of the RTT system, 
location feature is combined by two use cases: check in on map and get location. These 
two use cases could be two separate processes in the data flow diagram. As both of 
them are dealling with location information and they are both internal processes in 
system, these two processes are combined as one. This modification did not matter the 
final result. It indicated that some processes could be simplified when a data flow 
diagram is created. For the example above, use location service process is enough for 
the latter analysis, instead of check in on map process and get location process. The 
details within a function model can be simplified as one process. There is a general 
assumption in the LINDDUN tutorial for social websites matches this conjecture: for a 
social website, ”Internal DFD elements are considered trustworthy.” [Wuyts and 
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Joosen, 2015]. In the RTT system, all processes and data flows within processes are 
internal DFD elements. They are all considered trustworthy, and removed in following 
procedures. Secondly, some data flows can be combined, but others cannot. There are 
two data flow diagrams respectively shown in Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4. Besides the 
differences between lines and arrows, latter has 8 more data flows, such as df_17 and 
df_18. These 8 data flows are considered same as df_21 and df_22, and combined as 
one. The difference is mentioned and removed by assumption A2. However, some data 
flows, such as df_1 and df_2, cannot be removed, and they lead to potetial privacy 
threat points in Table 4-5. The two findings above reveal that assumptions are helpful to 
simplify a DFD. According to the general assumption for social websites: ”Internal 
DFD elements are considered trustworthy”, processes and data flows within processes 
can be abandon in later analysis. In another word, internal processes and data flows 
within processes could be simplified or removed. Data flows which are connected to 
entities and data stores deserve more attetion.  
 
In order to identify all hidden privacy threats and elicit all privacy requirements, 
analysts will try to present every detail of the system in a DFD. However, a simplified 
DFD with necessary processes and data flows might reach the same goal. Duplicate 
actions and redundant content could be simplified to make the DFD clear. Data flow 
diagram is working as a reminder to remind analyst where the weakness of the system is. 
Instead of covering every specific process of the system, it is more important to draw 
attetion on the weak points of the system.  
 
Figure 5-1Context diagram of the RTT system 
The second question is about other options than DFD. Figure 5-1 presents a simple 
context diagram of the RTT system. It contains all external entities related to RTT 
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system. Compared to the data flow diagram in Figure 4-4, there are many similarities 
between these two diagrams. Firstly, they both express some activities in the RTT 
system. Secondly, they both shows data types which the system uses to communicate 
with external entities and systems. These two similarities are both needed by the 
LINDDUN methodology. There is one difference between these two diagrams. The data 
flow diagram has a clear view of inside processes and data flows, while the context 
diagram does not. In Table 4-5, all potential privacy threat points related to internal data 
flows and internal processes are removed according to assumptions, except for the 
detectability of process. The detectability of process does not have an independent 
threat tree in the LINDDUN privacy threat tree catalog. It is refered to the information 
disclosure of process tree, which is assumed protected well in the RTT system in 
assumption A12. This result matches the general assumption in the LINDDUN tutorial 
again, ”Internal DFD elements are considered trustworthy”. In conclosion, at least for 
the RTT system, context diagram is able to take the place of the DFD without great 
influence.  
 
The general assumption in the LINDDUN tutorial ”Internal DFD elements are 
considered trustworthy” is for social websites. It still needs more studies and 
discussions when context diagram is applied to other system types. For example, a CS 
model game system contains two part: client and server. Both sides need protection on 
users’ information, as well as the communication between them. A context diagram 
cannot show these communications in a good view, because they are inside the system. 
In this case, a DFD is better to be applied. However, it shows another way to improve 
the LINDDUN methodology: start analysis with another a chosen diagram. A good 
expection is that the LINDDUN methodology keeps two or more different diagrams at 
the same time. For some systems which are simple and clear, like the RTT system, 
context diagram might be better. For other systems with more internal details, data flow 
diagram is a better choice which shows a clear internal view. A new system diagram 
type needs proper assumptions and privacy threat tree catalog. These are the future work 
of this thesis. 
 
5.3. Discussion on making assumptions 
When the author uses LINDDUN as an analyst, another difficult proccedure is to make 
assumptions. Making assumptions is an important procedure and deserves more 
instructions because of its importance. Every assumption results in adding or removing 
privacy threats from the privacy threats list. Secondly, making assumptions can fix 
problems of the data flow diagram, which is discussed in chapter 5.2, and make the 
LINDDUN custom. What’s more, it is a necessary process to reduce the workload.  
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No. System description  Assumptions 
1 General assumptions Combine elements which involve the same data 
type and apply to the same threat. 
2 Non-compliance threats should not be applied to a 
specific DFD element, but are applicable to the 
entire system. 
3 Social network Internal DFD elements are considered trustworthy. 
4 Non-repudiation and detectability threats are 
considered irrelevant. 
5 The systems without 
anonymous credentials, 
anonymous 
communication 
Linkability and identifiabilit of entity are not 
applicable. 
6 The systems without e-
voting, whistleblowing 
Non-repudiation of data store and data flow is not 
applicable.  
7 The systems that do not 
handle highly sensitive 
data. 
Threat types of processes are often not applicable or 
low priority. 
… … … 
Table 5-5 A brief guide to make assumptions 
LINDDUN is growing and updated aperiodically by its research group. The version of 
the LINDDUN methodology in this thesis is July, 2015. Only limited resources in the 
LINDDUN official tutorial are helpful to make assumptions. The researchers on the 
LINDDUN methodology have made much effort to improve assumptions hints, but they 
are still not clear enough. In the LINDDUN official tutorial, there are some tips on 
making assumptions: combining ’X’s and general assumptions [Wuyts and Joosen, 
2015, p27]. If several ’X’s involve the same type of data, they can be combined when 
they apply to the same threat. All non-compliance ’X’s shall be combined and applied 
to the entire system. These two rules are applicable for most systems. Besides, there are 
still 5 rules only applicable for specific systems. Internal DFD elements are considered 
trustworthy for social networks. The 4th rule removes non-repudiation and detectability 
for social networks. The 5th rule states that linkability and identifiability are only 
applicable to the systems which support anonymous use. The 6th rule indicates the 
situations which non-repudiation of data store and data flow are applicable. Finally, the 
7th rule points out one situation which threat types of processes are applicable. All these 
rules which appears in the LINDDUN tutorial can be summarized as Table 5-5. the tab 
system description shows the conditions when the assumptions are applicable. And the 
assumptions tab are all summarized by experience of LINDDUN’s authors. Enhancing 
guides to make assumptions is a good direction to improve LINDDUN. A brief rules list 
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to make assumptions shall be helpful. Considering there are many check list in the 
LINDDUN methodology, this rules list can be a new check list to help analysts make 
their own assumptions. This list can  be extended when new rules are found by 
researchers of LINDDUN.   
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6. Conclusion 
In this thesis, literature related to privacy concepts has been reviewed. Privacy issues 
gains increasing attention in now days. Proper tools and methods to deal with privacy 
issues shall be created and improved to meet people’s privacy requirements. LINDDUN 
is one of them. The LINDDUM methodology is reviewed in this thesis. A case study on 
the LINDDUN methodology and a workshop about privacy threats elicitation are 
conducted. Discusssions on creating a data flow diagram, making assumptions and 
other factors are given and summarized. A few issues are highlighted: A. The 
LINDDUN methodology is a more systematic methodology compared to other 
requirements elicitaition techniques, like workshop. Using the LINDDUN methodology 
reduces the chance to miss privacy threats of a system. However, non-compliance of 
entity, which caused by people’s unintentional actions, is missed by the LINDDUN 
framework as a flaw; B. Adding new diagrams, like context diagram, might be a good 
direction to rich the scope of application for the LINDDUN methodology; C. Hints and 
tips about making assumptions shall be more complete and specific. A simple summary 
of current hints and tips are organized as a guide list in section 5.3. An official guide on 
making assumptions will improve the usability of LINDDUN. These views will be 
helpful for LINDDUN’s further improvement.  
 
This thesis has several contributions. Firstly, one case study and one workshop are 
included and compared in this thesis. The discussion between two results of them 
implies some advantages and disadvantages of the LINDDUN methodology. Compared 
to workshop, the LINDDUN methodology lead the analyst to identify more privacy 
threats and get more privacy requirements. The procedure of LINDDUN makes 
analyzing process predictable, and makes the result more reliable. However, the 
LINDDUN methodology has a blind spot on non-compliance of entity. It ignores users’ 
unintentional misactions. Secondly, this thesis discussed details of DFD and other 
possibilities instead of DFD. DFD is supposed to be as complete as possible to identify 
all possible privacy threats. Meanwhile, context diagram is appliable and can produce 
similar result compared to DFD for the RTT system. New diagrams will rich the scope 
of applications of LINDDUN. It is another direction to improve the LINDDUN 
methodology. Finally, a guide on making assumptions are summarized with the help of 
the LINDDUN official tutorial and given examples. As an important procedure in the 
LINDDUN methodology, assumption making deserves more cretirions.   
 
There are some limitations in this thesis. The resources of LINDDUN are limited to one 
research group. The author lack means to compare the method with other privacy 
analysis methods. Second limitation is that the RTT system affects the result because of 
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its specifity. The RTT system only has basic social network features. Group members of 
the RTT team are all students. The workshop result is limited by participants’ 
knowledge, which might be biased. What’s more, the author is short of means to verify 
the result of neither the case study or the workshop. The verification is also a hard point 
for the LINDDUN methodology. The lack of verification shall be considered not only a 
limitation, but also a direction to do improvements. 
 
LINDDUN is not the end of people’s exploration to privacy issues. On the one hand, 
there is still space for LINDDUN to be practical and sufficient. There are many 
directions to improve LINDDUN. The concept framework could be more consummate, 
the procedures could have more optional factors, and even result verification is one 
improvement to LINDDUN. On the other hand, the LINDDUN framework is a good 
example of analyzing privacy requirements. Thanks to previous researchers, privacy 
issues is becoming more predictable and controllable in software development. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Data 1:  Privacy threats produced by LINDDUN 
 
Threat 01. Login threat.   
Summary  Users’ login information (account ID, password, profile…) is linkable 
to other logins, or too specific which can easily be an identity. The 
account will be linkable to other services. 
Primary 
misactor  
User. 
Basic flow  Bf1: Users use fixed information as id (or password, profile…) to 
login.  
Bf2: Potential attackers find similar ID or related information, then 
get more information which should not be open. 
Consequence: Potential attackers get more misactors’ information 
than expected. 
Leaf node(s)*  L_e2, L_e4, L_e5 
Root node(s)*  Linkability of entity  
DFD 
element(s)*  
Normal user  
 
 
Threat 02. Untrustworthy information receiver threat..   
Summary  Information receivers (service provider), or a part of users are not 
trustable.  
Primary 
misactor  
User, information receiver. 
Basic flow  Bf1: Users provide information.  
Bf2: The information is disclosed by misactor.  
Consequence: Potential attackers get users’ information through 
misactor. 
Leaf node(s)*  L_e3, L_e6, I_e3, I_e6 
Root node(s)*  Linkability of entity, identifiability of entity, non-compliance.  
DFD 
element(s)*  
Normal user  
 
 
Threat 03. Too much information sharing threat.    
Summary  Information receivers make bad user friendly privacy default setting. 
Users share too much information, and information receivers don’t 
minimize these information well, which is harmful to users’ privacy. 
Primary 
misactor  
User, information receiver, unskilled or intentional insider. 
Basic flow  Bf1: Users share too much information. 
Bf2: Information receiver does not minimize the information well. 
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Bf3: Potential attackers get users’ privacy information by inference.  
Consequence: Potential attackers get more misactors’ information 
than expected. 
Alter flow  Af1: Users share too much information. 
Af2: Information receiver does not minimize the information well. 
Af3: Potential attackers get users’ identifiable information by 
inference.  
Consequence: Potential attackers get more misactors’ information 
than expected. 
Leaf node(s)*  I_e2, I_e4, I_e5, I_e8, I_e12, I_e13, I_e17, I_e8, U_1, U_3. 
Root node(s)*  Linkability of entity, identifiability of entity, unawareness.  
DFD 
element(s)*  
Normal user  
 
 
Threat 04. Unclear or unawareness storage of information.   
Summary  The RTT information receiver collects user’s information. The user 
cannot check if the information receiver collects data or not. 
Primary 
misactor  
User, unskilled or intentional insider. 
Basic flow  Bf1: Information receivers collect and store users’ information.  
Bf2: Users cannot check and manage their information well, which 
increase the possibility of information disclosure.  
Consequence: Potential attackers get information without user’s 
awareness. 
Leaf node(s)*  U_2, U_5. 
Root node(s)*  Unawareness  
DFD 
element(s)*  
Normal user  
 
 
Threat 05. Spoofing a user of the RTT system by eavesdropping communication.    
Summary  The communication between user and system portal is not protected 
well. Potential attackers have chance to falsify user credential to 
spoof a user. 
Primary 
misactor  
Skilled outsider (attacker).  
Basic flow  Bf1: The misactor makes fake credential to login.    
Bf2: The misactor gets target user’s information.  
Consequence: Users’ information is disclosed. 
Leaf node(s)*  L_df3, I_df3, L_df6, I_df6. 
Root node(s)*  Linkability and identifiability of data flow. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
Df_1, 2, 3, 4. 
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Threat 06. Spoofing a user of the RTT system by falsifying credentials.    
Summary  The communication between user and system portal is not protected 
well. Potential attackers have chance to eavesdrop credential 
communication to spoof a user. 
Primary 
misactor  
Skilled outsider (attacker).  
Basic flow  Bf1: The misactor eavesdrops credential communication to get key 
information.    
Bf2: The misactor spoofs a user as an authorized user.  
Bf3: The misactor gets target user’s information.  
Consequence: Users’ information is disclosed. 
Leaf node(s)*  L_df3, I_df3, L_df6, I_df6. 
Root node(s)*  Linkability and identifiability of data flow. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
Df_1, 2, 3, 4. 
 
 
Threat 07. Credential is disclosed.     
Summary  The credential of users or content seller is disclosed. 
Primary 
misactor  
Skilled outsider (attacker).  
Basic flow  Bf1: The credential of users or content seller is disclosed.   
Bf2: The misactor gets the credential and are able to access data.  
Consequence: All data in the RTT system become in danger.  
Leaf node(s)*  ID_df2 
Root node(s)*  Information disclosure of data flow. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
Df_1, 2, 3, 4. 
 
 
Threat 08. Communication session token is disclosed.     
Summary  The communication token of one action in the RTT system is 
disclosed. 
Primary 
misactor  
Skilled outsider (attacker).  
Basic flow  Bf1: The communication token of one action in the RTT system is 
disclosed.   
Bf2: The misactor gets the communication token and get more data 
somehow. For example, spoofing a user or content seller.  
Consequence: Data related to disclosed communication become in 
dinger. 
Leaf node(s)*  ID_df2 
Root node(s)*  Information disclosure of data flow. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
All data flows 
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Threat 09. Information disclosure of internal process.     
Summary  The misactor is able to access an internal process, which should be 
out of his/her range. 
Primary 
misactor  
Unskilled or intentional insider.  
Basic flow  Bf1: The misactor makes good use of privilege to get access to target 
process, such as location process.   
Bf2: The misactor gets data.  
Consequence: Users’ data becomes in danger.  
Leaf node(s)*  ID_p1 
Root node(s)*  Information disclosure of process. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
All processes 
 
 
Threat 10. Communication content is disclosed.      
Summary  The communication content of one action in the RTT system is 
disclosed. 
Primary 
misactor  
Skilled outsider (attacker).  
Basic flow  Bf1: The communication token of one action in the RTT system is 
disclosed.   
Bf2: The misactor gets the communication content.  
Consequence: Users’ data becomes in danger.  
Leaf node(s)*  ID_df1 
Root node(s)*  Information disclosure of data flow. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
All data flows 
 
 
Threat 11. Communication with third party is not protected.      
Summary  Data is transmitted through an unprotected way to third party. The 
session token and communication content are both not protected well. 
Primary 
misactor  
Skilled outsider (attacker).  
Basic flow  Bf1: Users use third-party services through the RTT system. Or users 
use the RTT service with third-party account information support. 
Bf2: The communication token or content is disclosed.   
Bf3: The misactor gets the communication token, or get data directly.  
Consequence: Users’ data becomes in danger. 
Leaf node(s)*  ID_df1, L_df5, I_df5. 
Root node(s)*  Information disclosure of data flow. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
Df_27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34 
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Threat 12. Third party is untrustworthy.       
Summary  Third party information receivers are not trustable. 
Primary 
misactor  
Information receiver, unskilled or intentional insider.  
Basic flow  Bf1: Users use third-party services through the RTT system. Or users 
use the RTT service with third-party account information support. 
Bf2: The misactor discloses users’ information. Or the misactor does 
not protect users’ information well. 
Consequence: Users’ data is disclosed.  
Leaf node(s)*  ID_ds 
Root node(s)*  Linkability, identifiability, information disclosure of data store. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
Bank database, google map database, other third party databases. 
 
 
Threat 13. Database is untrustworthy.        
Summary  The RTT database, namely Mongo database is untrustworthy, or, not 
protected well. 
Primary 
misactor  
Unskilled or intentional insider.  
Basic flow  Bf1: User information is stored in the RTT database.    
Bf2: Potential attackers steal data from the RTT database. 
Consequence: Users’ data is disclosed.  
Leaf node(s)*  ID_ds  
Root node(s)*  Linkability, identifiability, information disclosure of data store. 
DFD 
element(s)*  
Mongo database 
 
 
Threat 14. Incorrect or insufficient privacy policies.        
Summary  Privacy policy for RTT is incorrect or insufficient, which makes users 
unconsent on collection and usage of user data. 
Primary 
misactor  
Unskilled or intentional insider.  
Basic flow  Bf1: Users accept incorrect or insufficient privacy policies. Or users 
do not read privacy policies.  
Bf2: Information receivers collect and store users’ information for 
untrustworthy purposes.   
Consequence: Users’ information is disclosed to the misactor. 
Leaf node(s)*  NC_2, NC_3, NC_4. 
Root node(s)*  Non-compliance 
DFD 
element(s)*  
All elements except entity.  
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Threat 15. Non-compliance insider actions        
Summary  Skilled insiders intentionally access data and disclose data. 
Primary 
misactor  
Intentional insider.  
Basic flow  Bf1: Skilled insiders access users’ data.  
Bf2: Skilled insiders share data with potential attackers. 
Consequence: Users’ information is disclosed to the misactor. 
Leaf node(s)*  NC_2, NC_3, NC_4. 
Root node(s)*  Non-compliance 
DFD 
element(s)*  
All elements except entity.  
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Appendix 2 
 
LINDDUN workshop interview questions: 
 
This interview is for LINDDUN workshop participants. Please answer the questions 
after you finish the workshop issues. 
 
1. How many projects have you involved totally? Do you have experience on 
requirements engineering in previous projects?  
2. Value the output of your work: Data Flow Diagram, from no help (0) to great help 
(5). 
3. Value the output of your work: Privacy threats list, from no help (0) to great help 
(5). 
4. Which part is most difficult in the workshop? Which part is most useful in the 
workshop? 
5. What support do you mostly want in the workshop? When do you feel like you 
need help? 
6. What method or tool did you use in the workshop? How does this help you? 
7. Anything else? 
 
 
